


Equal pay for work of equal  
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
Ontario  
Ministry of  
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# Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value

A Discussion Paper





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EQUAL PAY FOR WORK OF EQUAL VALUE

*A DISCUSSION PAPER*

ONTARIO MINISTRY OF LABOUR

October 1976

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
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## INTRODUCTION

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### THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK IN ONTARIO

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<sup>1</sup> *The Municipality of  
Court of Appeal*

## INTRODUCTION

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### THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK IN ONTARIO

The legislative history of equal pay for women in Ontario is relatively brief. Prior to 1951, there were no statutes requiring that a woman should receive equal pay to that of a man for performing an identical task. Passage of the Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act (1951) made Ontario the first jurisdiction in Canada to enact equal pay legislation.

Since 1951, Ontario has continued to be a leader in the extension of equal pay legislation. In 1962, the provisions of the Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act were incorporated into the Human Rights Code. At this time, the section's effectiveness was still limited, however, since investigations by the Commission could be made only following a complaint. It was therefore a progressive step when, in January 1969, the equal pay statute was transferred to the Employment Standards Act. Part V, Equal Pay for Equal Work, established that no employer could discriminate by paying a female employee at a rate of pay less than that paid to a male employee

employed by him for the same work, performed in the same establishment, the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility and which is performed under similar working conditions...

Enforcement was expanded to include routine investigation procedures as well as action on complaints.

In April 1970, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Act applied to work of the same "nature" or "kind". It stated that to construe "the same work" as meaning "the identical work" is to render redundant the subsequent words "the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility."<sup>1</sup> Judicial interpretation thus extended the scope of the Equal

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<sup>1</sup> *The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto vs. Howard and Warren*, Ontario Court of Appeal, April 16, 1970.

Pay section beyond the original meaning of "equal work" to the broader concept of "similar work".

In light of this extended interpretation of the wording of the Act, the section was further amended on January 1, 1975. This change extended the meaning of the old Act, stating that:

No employer or person acting on behalf of an employer shall differentiate between his male and female employees by paying a female employee at a rate of pay less than that paid to a male employee, or vice versa, for substantially the same work performed in the same establishment, the performance of which requires substantially the same skill, effort and responsibility and which is performed under similar working conditions....

Insertion of the word "substantially" changed the language of the Act to avoid the necessity of proving that the work of men and women was identical.

Present equal pay legislation requires that a man and woman must be doing "substantially the same job" and that the jobs must require "substantially the same skill, effort and responsibility ... under similar working conditions". Each criterion must be rated separately. If two jobs are equal in skill and responsibility and are performed under similar working conditions, but the lower paid job does not qualify as equal in effort, equal pay legislation cannot be applied. Similarly, if two jobs required substantially the same skill, effort and responsibility and involved similar working conditions but were totally dissimilar in nature, equal pay would not apply.

In enforcing the Equal Pay section of the law, the officer looks at the actual work performed by the employee, not the tasks outlined in the formal job description. Investigators examine not only the tasks performed but also the frequency of their performance. If a male employee is required to wash

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windows once a year, his job is not considered to be substantially different from that of a female co-worker whose job does not involve window cleaning.

The Equal Pay section of the Employment Standards Act has been effective in helping women in the labour force. In 1975, 14 employers were assessed for a total amount of \$35,907.22. In all, 81 women benefitted from this enforcement effort. Since 1973, that is under the old Equal Pay section and the new, a total of \$617,084.03 has been collected for women.

LIMITATIONS  
OF PRESENT  
EQUAL PAY  
LEGISLATION...

The Act has been effective in benefitting many women doing substantially the same work as their male counterparts. Criticisms have been leveled, however, at the fact that many women in Ontario are not covered by the Act since they work in job areas populated totally by women and cannot compare the work they do with that of a man. The establishment of single sex job categories could in fact be used to avoid compliance with the existing equal pay legislation.

HAVE LED  
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IN EQUAL PAY  
FOR WORK OF  
EQUAL VALUE...

Concern about the inability of the present legislation to deal with female/male pay differentials for different jobs has led some observers to suggest that the legislation's present focus on "substantially the same work" be broadened to include, or be replaced by, legislation requiring equal pay for "work of equal value". The intent of such legislation would be to enable comparison of pay rates between men and women working in dissimilar jobs. Where it can be shown that such jobs involve the same skill, effort, and responsibility, women and men would receive equal rates of pay.

...BUT THUS  
FAR

...THERE HAS  
BEEN LITTLE  
ANALYSIS OF THE  
EQUAL VALUE  
CONCEPT

Equal pay for work of equal value recently has been the subject of considerable discussion and often heated argument. However, this discussion has not yet produced a thorough analysis of the concept of equal value, how it can be measured, or the implications of applying this concept to the labour

market. Neither has there been a thorough analysis of the extent and causes of pay differentials between female and male workers, the problem for which equal pay for work of equal value is sometimes advanced as a solution.

PURPOSE  
AND  
LIMITATIONS  
OF THIS  
REPORT

The purpose of this Report is to provide a more thorough analysis of the concept of equal pay for work of equal value in order to improve the quality of the current debate. It is hoped that this analysis will assist interested persons and groups to draw their own tentative conclusions as to the extent to which the application of the concept of equal pay for work of equal value will ameliorate the problem to which it is addressed and, also, as to the extent to which its application may create other problems. These conclusions, however, can only be tentative in view of the small amount of relevant empirical evidence that is now available.

It is because of this lack of relevant empirical evidence that the Report stops short of examining *specific* public policy alternatives relating to equal value and making recommendations. In our view present knowledge of such things as the nature and determinants of female/male wage differentials or the effects of job evaluation structures upon such differentials is not adequate to permit systematic assessment of various specific policy alternatives relating to equal pay for work of equal value.

Rather than attempting to formulate and assess specific policy alternatives related to equal value, this Report concentrates on examining female/male pay and earnings differentials and exploring the concept of equal pay for work of equal value.

At present there are no generally accepted procedures or criteria for measuring the value of different jobs. Therefore, there are no data which could be used to assess, even very roughly, the extent to

EXAMINATION  
OF FEMALE/MALE  
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which females and males are paid differently for jobs of equal value. However, it was thought that this Report should at least include some description of present female/male earnings differentials, since it is concern about the existence of such differentials which has generated interest in the concept of equal pay for work of equal value. The extent of pay differentials between male and female workers is examined in Chapter I of the Report. The Chapter is used to describe female/male earnings and wage differentials, and to present some new data in the form of unpublished tabulations from the 1971 Census and the 1974 Canada Department of Labour Survey of Wages. The tables concentrate on earnings and pay rate differentials *within* occupations — both broad census occupational groups and classes, and more narrowly defined occupations. A problem in conducting this examination was the shortage of relevant empirical evidence, perhaps explaining the general lack of systematic analyses of female/male wage differentials in Canada.

THE CONCEPT  
OF EQUAL  
VALUE

AND

ITS  
IMPLICATIONS

The determination of "equal value" is the focal point of the second chapter. Without both accepted criteria and an accepted procedure for determining equal value, it is impossible to make the comparisons of wage rates for different occupations required for the implementation of the concept of equal pay for work of equal value. The second chapter begins with a brief discussion of the concept of equal value, and concludes with a lengthy discussion of the possibilities and problems of determining equal value jobs through job evaluation systems.

The most important implications flowing from the application of equal pay for work of equal value are discussed in the third chapter. These implications are increased government intervention in the wage determination process, impact on allocation of labour, cost effects, and relationship to the anti-inflation

program. Again, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions because of the lack of necessary data (e.g., for predicting costs), and the lack of measures of value to indicate the existence of equal value jobs. In addition, descriptions of equal pay legislation in several countries are given in the Appendix.

EQUAL VALUE  
vs.  
EQUAL OPPOR-  
TUNITY

As noted above, the purpose of this Report is to provide analysis of the concept of equal pay for work of equal value, not to assess specific public policy alternatives relating to equal value. However, it should be emphasized in passing that no assessment of policy alternatives regarding equal pay for work of equal value would be complete without considering the relationship between equal pay and equal opportunity. To a large extent, the problem which equal pay for work of equal value addresses is the preponderance of females in low-paying occupations. Equal pay for work of equal value is one approach to this problem; equal opportunity is another. Increasingly, however, governments are becoming aware that the equal pay problem must not be treated in isolation; it must be considered in the broader context of equality of opportunity and treatment between the sexes.<sup>2</sup>

A detailed examination of equal opportunity policies and of the relationship between equal opportunity and equal value is beyond the scope of this Report. However, we should indicate that by the term 'equal opportunity' we mean vigorous enforcement of the sex and marital status provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Code -- particularly the merit employment principles in Section 4 regarding recruitment, hiring, training, and advancement; as well as the affirmative action programs of the Ontario Human Rights Commission

<sup>2</sup> *Equal Remuneration: General Survey by the Committee of Experts, International Labour Conference, 1975.*

and the Women's Programs Division<sup>3</sup> of the Ministry of Labour, and the various activities of these bodies to combat sex-stereotypes and to change public (especially employer) attitudes and community practices which breed discriminatory behaviour.

These equal opportunity measures reflect the existing public policy commitment in Ontario toward equal rights and equality for all citizens, evidenced not only by Human Rights Legislation but also by minimum wage, regional development, creation of an Ombudsman's Office and many other programs.

While examination of the role and effectiveness of equal opportunity measures is beyond the scope of this Report, it is important to recognize that these measures could contribute substantially to the reduction of female/male imbalance in higher paying occupations. The success of these equal opportunity measures should, to some extent, determine whether there is a need for other measures such as equal pay for work of equal value. On the other hand, implementation of equal pay for work of equal value would not be cause for the relaxation of equal opportunity efforts. Indeed, attempts by employers to minimize the cost impacts of equal pay for work of equal value (see Chapter 3), might imply an even greater need for the enforcement of equal opportunity legislation.

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<sup>3</sup> The Ministry of Labour Women's Bureau consulting service was established early in 1975, to help employers develop equal opportunity programs for women, and thus to maximize all their human resources. As many major corporations operating in Canada are Ontario-based, this province has a unique opportunity to be a leader in the area of "Affirmative Action" for women. Meetings are held between Bureau consultants and an organization's top management and key personnel, to outline the problems and some of their causes, and suggest a framework for tackling them. Once a commitment to an equal opportunity program is made, the expertise and resources of the Women's Bureau are available to the organization on an ongoing basis.

SECTION ONE:  
MEDIAN ANNUAL  
EARNINGS

CHAPTER ONE: FEMALE/MALE EARNINGS AND PAY DIFFERENTIALS

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Implementation of equal pay for work of equal value would remedy situations where females are being paid less than males for performing jobs which according to generally accepted criteria and measurement procedures are deemed to be of equal value to males' jobs. However, except within the confines of particular job evaluation plans, there are no generally accepted criteria or procedures for measuring the value of different jobs. In the absence of such accepted criteria and procedures, it is impossible to produce data that could be used to quantify the specific problem of unequal pay for work of equal value. However, there is some information available on female/male earnings differentials, in aggregate and by occupation. This information does not relate to the specific question of unequal pay for work of equal value and by itself cannot be used to estimate how much the present female/male earnings gap could be reduced by implementing some form of equal pay for work of equal value. Yet, since the ultimate objective of equal pay for work of equal value is to reduce female/male pay differentials, it would seem important to describe and examine these differentials in this Report. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to summarize briefly what can be learned about female/male pay differentials from available data.

SECTION ONE:  
MEDIAN ANNUAL  
EARNINGS

The Chapter begins with a brief examination of annual earnings differentials between males and females, derived from 1971 census data. The census is the most comprehensive source of information on aggregate sex differentials in remuneration. However, for analytical purposes, the census has a number of serious deficiencies which are described later in the chapter. Following the brief summary of sex differentials which show up in census data, the discussion moves on to various measures of wage rate differentials

for selected occupations among and within establishments. The data presented on wage rate differentials are not as comprehensive in scope as the census data, but are believed to be considerably more reliable than the census data. The chapter concludes with a short summary of the main points revealed by analysis in this Report and in the few previous studies which have been made of male/female earnings and pay differentials in Canada.

Table 1 shows that in Ontario in 1971, the ratio of median annual earnings for females to that of males was 46.1 per cent.

TABLE 1  
Ratio of Female to Male Median Annual  
Earnings, Ontario, 1971<sup>a</sup>

Adjustment Factor	Ratio
Unadjusted	46.1
Annual hours worked <sup>b</sup>	57.5

<sup>a</sup>Based on data from 1971 Census of Canada

<sup>b</sup>Based on annual earnings of those working 49-52 weeks, 35 or more hours per week.

Earnings figures for all individuals were included in deriving this ratio. When only the earnings of full-time, full-year workers are considered, the ratio increases to 57.5 per cent.

As mentioned above, many factors contribute to the over-all earnings differential between men and women: number of hours and weeks worked, occupation, industry, age, education, experience, seniority, geographic location, and rate of pay. Tables 2 through 6 look at the first four factors: hours and weeks worked, occupation and industry.

Females work fewer hours per week than males. Approximately 30 per cent of females normally worked less than 35 hours per week, while 9 per cent of the men were in this category. Although comparable data for Ontario are not published, the distribution for the province is probably similar to that for Canada.

Women also tend to work fewer weeks during the year than do men, on the average. Approximately 15 per cent of male workers were employed between 1 and 26 weeks in 1971, while 29 per cent of females were in that range. Sixty-three per cent of men and 46 per cent of women worked between 49 and 52 weeks.

HOURS WORKED  
PER WEEK

TABLE 2

Percentage Distribution of Hours Worked  
Per Week by Sex, Canada, 1971

Hours Worked Per Week	Percentage	
	Males	Females
Less than 35	9.2	29.5
35 - 44	60.6	60.1
45 and over	30.2	10.5
Total	100.0	100.0

Note: Figures may not add to 100.0, due to rounding.

Source: 1971 Census of Canada, Cat. No. 94-783 "Hours Worked by Sex, Industry, and Occupation for Labour Force and Wage-Earners".

WEEKS WORKED  
PER YEAR

TABLE 3

Percentage Distribution of Weeks Worked  
Per Year by Sex, Ontario, 1971

Weeks Worked Per Year	Percentage	
	Males	Females
1 - 26	14.8	28.9
27 - 48	22.1	25.5
49 - 52	63.0	45.6
Total	100.0	100.0

Note: Figures may not add to 100.0 due to rounding.

Source: 1971 Census of Canada, Cat. No. 94-782, "Occupation by Sex, Labour Force Activity and Weeks Worked".

SECTION TWO:  
OCCUPATIONAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Based on 1971 Census data, in only two occupations (supervisors: nursing occupations and university teaching and related not elsewhere classified) did median earnings for women exceed median earnings for men. The first occupation is ranked 20th for females, and 200th for males--representing a high-paying occupation for females, and a relatively low-paying occupation for males. Similarly, the second occupation ranked 50th for women and 358th for men. In almost all job categories occupied by men and women, women consistently earned less than men.

RANKING OF  
SELECTED  
OCCUPATIONS

Table 4 below shows rankings for selected occupations by median annual earnings for men and women.

Two different distributions appear. The top three occupations--general managers and other senior officials, physicians and surgeons, and dentists--are the same for both men and women, although not in the same rank order. Six of the top 15 occupations for men have *no women* reported as working full time, full year. These include: judges and magistrates, management occupations in natural science and engineering, optometrists, members of legislative bodies, osteopaths and chiropractors, and veterinarians.

Seven of the top 15 occupations for women are also among the 15 top ranked occupations for men. Of the remaining eight, however, the corresponding rankings for men range from 28 to 49. These occupations are: educational and vocational counsellors, management occupations--social science and related fields, secondary school teachers, commissioned officers, civil engineers, producers and directors, pharmacists, and post-secondary teachers (N.E.C.).

Table 5 shows the percentage distribution of males and females for the 22 major occupational groups in Ontario. Over 50 per cent of females are concentrated in the relatively low-paid clerical and service occupations.

TABLE 4

Ranking of Selected Occupations of Full-Time, Full-Year Workers  
by Median Earnings and Sex, Ontario, 1971

Females		Corres- ponding Rank for Males	Males		Corres- ponding Rank for Females
Rank	Occupation		Occupation		
1	General Managers and Other Senior Officials	2	1 Physicians and Surgeons		2
2	Physicians and Surgeons	1	2 General Managers and Other Senior Officials		1
3	Dentists	3	3 Dentists		3
4	University Teachers	11	4 Judges and Magistrates		*
5	Administrators in Teaching and Related Fields	10	5 Lawyers and Notaries		7
6	Educational and Vocational Counsellors	33	6 Sales and Administrative Management		105
7	Lawyers and Notaries	5	7 Management Occupations: Natural Science and Engineering		*
8	Management Occupations: Social Science and Related Fields	46	8 Optometrists		*
9	Secondary School Teachers	49	9 Members of Legislative Bodies		*
10	Commissioned Officers: Armed Forces	41	10 Administrators in Teaching and Related Occs.		5
11	Civil Engineers	31	11 University Teachers		4
12	Producers and Directors: Performing and Audio-Visual Arts	35	12 Financial Management Occupations		61
13	Pharmacists	29	13 Osteopaths and Chiropractors		*
14	Administrators in Medicine and Health	15	14 Veterinarians		*
15	Post-Secondary School Teachers N.E.C.	28	15 Administrators in Medicine and Health		14

Source: 1971 Census of Canada, Cat. No. 94-767, "Income of Individuals".

A table of all occupations ranked by median annual earnings for full-time, full-year workers is included in the Appendix. The table gives rank and median earnings for men and women as well as the earnings ratio for each occupation.

Asterisk indicates no women reported as working full time, full year.

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Materi  
Other  
Occupat

Source:

Note:

TABLE 5

Percentage Distribution of Full-Time, Full-Year Workers  
By Sex and Major Occupational Group, Ontario, 1971

Corresponding Rank for Females	Occupation Group	Percentage Males	Percentage Females
	Managerial, Administrative, etc.	7.5	3.1
2	Natural Science & Engineering	4.9	0.8
	Social Sciences	0.9	1.2
1	Religion	0.4	0.1
	Teaching	2.5	7.1
3	Medicine & Health	1.5	8.9
*	Artistic, Recreational, etc.	1.0	0.7
7	Clerical	8.3	40.1
105	Sales	10.5	6.4
	Service	8.5	10.2
*	Farming, etc.	4.3	0.7
	Fishing, etc.	-	-
*	Forestry & Logging	0.3	-
	Mining, Quarrying, etc.	1.0	-
*	Processing	5.0	2.2
	Machining	5.9	1.0
5	Product Fabricating, Assembling, Repairing, etc.	10.4	6.8
	Construction Trades	8.7	0.2
4	Transport Equipment Operating	5.4	0.2
61	Materials Handling	2.5	1.9
	Other Crafts, etc.	2.1	0.7
*	Occupations Not Elsewhere Classified	8.4	7.7
*			
	Total	100.0	100.0

Source: 1971 Census of Canada, Statistics Canada, "Income of Individuals", Catalogue No. 94-767, Vol. III, Part 6.

Note: Dashes indicate that figures were not significant.

Percentage distribution of males and females refer to those full-time full-year workers who reported that they earned income from employment.

RATIO OF FEMALE/  
MALE ANNUAL  
EARNINGS

The ratios of female to male average earnings for these occupational groups are given in Table 6.

The overall ratio of female to male earnings for all occupations was 0.57. If the occupational distribution of the female and male work force were identical, but the earnings differentials within each occupation remained as they are--this ratio would be 0.63 (using the female occupational distribution) and 0.66 (using the male occupational distribution).

Differences in occupational distribution, therefore, accounted for 6 to 9 percentage points of the initial 43 percentage-point difference in the annual earnings of full-time, full-year male and female workers. When adjusted for occupational distribution, the overall ratio for "all occupations" increased by 10 to 16 per cent. (Columns four and five of Table 6).

Female/male earnings differentials varied widely among the major occupational groupings. Adjustments were made also for the occupational distributions within each major group. In general, this adjustment raised the ratio, that is, narrowed the gap between male and female earnings. The earnings ratios for six occupational groups--managerial - administration, social sciences, sales, service, product fabricating, and other crafts were below the all-occupation group average. Although adjustment for occupational distribution within each of these groups increased these ratios by 10 to 59 per cent, the earnings gap was still at least 33 per cent. The most remarkable shift occurred in medicine and health occupations. There, the adjustment for occupational distribution within the group increased the ratio from 0.68 to 1.21. This adjustment for occupational distribution has a strong effect because females tend to be concentrated in occupations like dieticians' assistants, and nurses, while males are more prevalent as physicians, dentists, and optometrists.

On the other hand, in clerical, artistic, and recreational occupations, adjustments for occupational distribution did not improve the ratio.

The Census data on occupational earnings differentials presented above have several deficiencies. The information pertains to fairly broad occupational groups or classes; it depends upon individuals' self-designation of their occupation and earnings; it takes no account of differences related to type of industry, unionization, location, seniority or establishment size; and it includes earnings factors other than hourly wage rates--eg. overtime rates, bonuses, etc..

TABLE 6

Ratio of Female To Male Annual Earnings of Full-Time Full-Year Workers  
Adjusted and Unadjusted Data, by Major Occupational Group,  
Ontario, 1971

Occupation	Un- (a) adjusted	Adjusted for Occupational Distribution		Per cent Change in Ratio from Adjustment	
		Female (b) Weights	Male (c) Weights	Female Weights	Male Weights
All Occupations	0.57	0.63	0.66	10.5	16.0
Managerial, Administrative, etc.	0.49	0.59	0.55	20.4	12.2
Natural Science & Engineering	0.67	0.69	0.71	3.0	6.0
Social Sciences	0.49	0.58	0.78	18.4	59.2
Religion	0.67	0.56	0.63	-16.4	-6.0
Teaching	0.68	0.80	0.83	17.6	22.1
Medicine & Health	0.68	1.21	0.81	77.9	19.1
Artistic, Recreational, etc.	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.0	-1.5
Clerical	0.66	0.67	0.65	1.5	-1.5
Sales	0.47	0.55	0.52	17.0	10.6
Service	0.52	0.67	0.63	28.8	21.2
Farming, etc.	0.63	0.66	0.72	4.8	14.3
Mining, quarrying, etc.	0.77	0.78	0.78	1.3	1.3
Processing	0.57	0.61	0.63	7.0	10.5
Machining	0.57	0.59	0.60	3.5	5.3
Product Fabricating, etc.	0.52	0.66	0.62	26.9	19.2
Construction	0.66	0.69	0.66	4.5	0.0
Transport Equipment Operating	0.59	0.68	0.58	15.3	-1.7
Materials Handling	0.59	0.68	0.65	15.3	10.2
Other Crafts, etc.	0.54	0.64	0.60	18.5	11.1
Occupations Not Elsewhere Classified	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.0	0.0

Source: 1971 Census, "Income of Individuals" Cat. No. 94-767.

(a)  $\frac{\sum E_f N_f}{\sum E_m N_m}$  where  $E_f$  and  $E_m$  are the average annual earnings of full-time, full-

year females and males, respectively in each of the 332 occupations (jobs occupied by both males and females) and  $N_f$  and  $N_m$  are proportions of females and males in each of the selected occupations.

(b)  $\frac{\sum E_f N_f}{\sum E_m N_f}$  ; (c)  $\frac{\sum E_f N_m}{\sum E_m N_m}$

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SECTION THREE:  
FEMALE/MALE PAY  
RATIOS IN  
NARROWLY DEFINED  
OCCUPATIONS

The following section, based upon published and unpublished data from a Canada Department of Labour 1974 survey, attempts to overcome some of the deficiencies noted above in describing female/male wage rate differentials for narrowly defined occupations. The limitations of this survey and the methods used for calculating the ratios are presented in the Notes following Table 7.

As a result of these limitations it was possible to provide figures on female/male pay ratios only for selected occupations. A summary of the ratios for office occupations in Toronto, Ottawa and Thunder Bay is given in Table 7. The summary for non-office occupations in Toronto and Ottawa is given in Table 8.<sup>1</sup>

OFFICE OCCUPATIONS

The median ratio for office occupations was .85 in Toronto, .96 in Ottawa, and .71 in Thunder Bay, and the median ratio for the three cities was .90. The Toronto median ratio ranged from .85 in "all industries" to .91 in the union category. The Ottawa median ratio ranged from .85 in establishments with less than 100 employees to 1.00 in the union category. This pattern was somewhat different in Thunder Bay where the median ratio ranged from .69 in establishments with less than 100 employees to .89 in establishments with 100 to 499 employees.

The lowest ratio in office occupations was .52 in Ottawa for Manager, Administration in establishments with 100 to 499 employees. The highest ratio was 1.38 in Toronto for Programmer, Junior in the union category.

In Toronto, the occupation of Manager, Administration provided the floor ratio consistently.

In Ottawa, the lowest ratio was associated with the Bookkeeper, Senior and Manager, Administration. Ratios above 1.00 were recorded for Computer Operator, Junior; Computer Peripheral Equipment Operator; Clerk, General Office, Junior; Secretary, Junior; Accounting Clerk, Junior; Office Boy/Girl, and Stock Records Clerk.

In Thunder Bay the lowest ratio was associated with Clerk, General Office, Junior and the highest ratio was for Clerk, General Office, Senior.

<sup>1</sup> The criteria for calculating pay ratios from the Canada Department of Labour survey data (see Notes, p. 19) permitted calculation of ratios for 20 office occupations and 38 non-office occupations, together covering about 116,000 employees. Additional information on these ratios and on the relationship between pay ratios and establishment size and unionization is available in the Research Branch of the Ontario Ministry of Labour.

In the three cities combined, the lowest ratios for office occupations tend to occur in establishments with less than 100 employees and in the non-union category. Conversely, the highest ratio is found in the union category and in the establishments with 500 or more employees.

NON-OFFICE  
OCCUPATIONS  
(specific industry)

Table 8 presents analogous female/male pay ratios for non-office specific industry occupations in Toronto and Ottawa.

The median ratio for non-office occupations in the two cities was .88. The median ratio for both the cities combined ranged from .77 in establishments with less than 100 employees to .97 in establishments with 500 or more employees. The Toronto median ratio ranged from .72 to .97 while Ottawa median ratio ranged from .86 to .94.

The lowest ratio in non-office occupations was .55 in Toronto for Short Order Cook (Restaurants) in restaurants with less than 100 employees. The highest ratio of 1.15 was found in two occupations: Baker Helper (Bakeries) in Toronto in bakeries with less than 100 employees, and Diagnostic Radiological Technician in hospitals in Ottawa.

In Ottawa, the lowest ratio was associated with Bindery Worker (Printing and Publishing) in establishments with 100 to 499 employees.

The following three non-office occupations occurred in 3 or more industries each.

- (i) Assembler, Production: In the Electrical Industrial Equipment industry in Toronto, the ratio varied from .68 in establishments with less than 100 employees to .90 in establishments 500 and over.
- (ii) Beverage Waiter/Waitress: The ratio ranged from .92 in hotels, under 100 employees in Toronto to 1.13 in hotels, under 200 employees in Ottawa.
- (iii) Kitchen Helper: The lowest ratio was .81 in restaurants with 100 to 499 employees in Toronto, and the highest ratio was 1.07 in restaurants with less than 100 employees in Ottawa.

For non-office occupations the lowest ratio occurs more frequently in small establishments (less than 100 employees) and the highest ratio is found generally in larger establishments.

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TABLE 7

Female/Male Pay Ratio (Lowest, Median, and Highest) for Selected Office Occupations in Toronto, Ottawa and Thunder Bay, 1974

Description	All Industries	Establishment Size			Union	Non-Union
		500 & Over	100 to 499	Less than 100		
MEDIAN RATIO FOR THREE CITIES (Toronto, Ottawa and Thunder Bay)	.90	.92	.87	.84	.97	.87
TORONTO LOWEST RATIO: - Manager, Administration	.72	.71	.73	.71	.70	.72
TORONTO MEDIAN RATIO:	.85	.90	.86	.86	.91	.89
TORONTO HIGHEST RATIO: - Programmer, Junior - Secretary, Junior - Order Clerk - Secretary, Senior - Office Boy/Girl	.97 .97	1.04	.99	1.03	1.38	1.01
OTTAWA LOWEST RATIO: - Bookkeeper, Senior - Manager, Administration - Order Clerk - Accounting Clerk, Senior	.80	.59	.52	.74	.75	.65
OTTAWA MEDIAN RATIO	.96	.99	.89	.85	1.00	.90
OTTAWA HIGHEST RATIO: - Computer Operator, Junior - Computer Peripheral Equip. Operator - Clerk, General Office, Junior - Secretary, Junior - Accounting Clerk, Junior - Office Boy/Girl - Stock Records Clerk	1.03 1.03	1.03 1.03 1.03	1.04	1.09	1.06	1.00
THUNDER BAY LOWEST RATIO: - Clerk, General Office, Junior - Accounting Clerk, Senior - Clerk, General Office, Senior	.64	.67	.68	.66	.68	.71
THUNDER BAY MEDIAN RATIO	.71	.72	.89	.69	.86	.77
THUNDER BAY HIGHEST RATIO: - Clerk, General Office, Intermediate - Clerk, General Office, Senior - Accounting Clerk, Senior - Clerk, General Office, Junior	.82	.75	.97	.69 .69 .69	.88	.83

Source: Canada Department of Labour, 1974 Survey of Wages and Working Conditions.

NOTES ON  
CALCULATION  
OF FEMALE/MALE  
PAY RATIOS  
(TABLES 7 & 8)

These data are taken from the Canada Department of Labour 1974 Survey of Wage and Working Conditions. The survey covers establishments with 20 or more employees in selected cities. The criteria used by the Canada Department of Labour for publishing statistical measures (average, median, deciles, quartiles) for an occupation are (i) the wage rates must apply to at least 5 employees in three establishments, or (ii) the rates must apply to 10 or more employees in two establishments provided that more than 20 per cent of the total number of employees is reported by both establishments. These criteria are applied in order to avoid revealing the rates paid by any one establishment and, to ensure that the data are reasonably representative. The criteria used in selecting occupations to be surveyed are (i) numerical importance, (ii) prevalence throughout the industry or community, (iii) importance in the production process, and (iv) capability of clear definition.

Where possible, wage rates are shown by size of establishment and on a union/non-union basis. Figures included in the union category, were for those occupations where 50 per cent or more of the employees in the establishment were covered by a collective agreement. Where less than 50 per cent were covered, the figures reported were included in the non-union category.

For purposes of this Report, data from three cities--Toronto, Ottawa, and Thunder Bay were analyzed.

In order to eliminate the influence of extreme values, median wage rates instead of averages were used for computing the female/male pay ratio for an occupation. Ratios are calculated *only if* an occupation had at least 20 males and at least 20 females and pay was given in time-rates. Occupations paid on the basis of piece work, production or incentive bonus, commission or mileage systems, were excluded.

Separate analyses were done for 20 cross-industry office occupations and 38 specific industry non-office occupations.

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TABLE 8

Female/Male Pay Ratio (Lowest, Median and Highest) for Selected Non-Office Occupations by Specific Industry, Toronto & Ottawa, 1974

Description	Industry	Establishment Size		
		500 & over	100 to 499	Less than 100
MEDIAN RATIO FOR TWO CITIES (Toronto & Ottawa)	.88	.97	.83	.77
TORONTO LOWEST RATIO:				
- Assembler Production (Wire & Wire Products)	.59			
- Bindery Worker (Printing & Publishing)		.67	.66	
- Salesperson, Class C (Other Retail Trade)			.66	
- Short Order Cook (Restaurants)				.55
TORONTO MEDIAN RATIO	.87	.97	.83	.72
TORONTO HIGHEST RATIO:				
- Kitchen Helper (Hotels, 200 & More Employees)	1.02	1.00		
- Beverage Waiter/Waitress (Hotels, 200 or More Employees)		1.00		
- Medical Lab Technician (Hospitals)		1.00		
- Psychiatric Attendant (Hospitals)		1.00		
- Salesperson, Class A (Other Retail Trade)		1.00		
- Cashier, Office (Shoesale Trade)			1.13	
- Baker Helper (Bakeries)				1.15
OTTAWA LOWEST RATIO:				
- Bindery Worker (Printing and Publishing)	.63		.56	.62
- Salesperson, Class B (Other Retail Trade)		.80		
OTTAWA MEDIAN RATIO	.90	.92	.86	.94
OTTAWA HIGHEST RATIO:				
- Diagnostic Radiological Technician (Hospitals)	1.15	1.15		
- Kitchen Helper (Restaurants)			.90	1.07
RATIO IN MULTI-INDUSTRY OCCUPATIONS				
1. ASSEMBLER, PRODUCTION				
- Wire & Wire Products (Toronto)	.59			.74
- Communications Equipment (Toronto)	.82		.83	.71
- Electrical Industrial Equipment (Toronto)	.78	.90	.78	.68
2. BEVERAGE WAITER/WAITRESS				
- Hotels, 200 & More Employees (Toronto)	1.00	1.00		
- Hotels, under 200 Employees (Toronto)	.92		.93	.92
- Hotels, under 200 Employees (Ottawa)	1.13			1.01
3. KITCHEN HELPER				
- Hotels, 200 & More Employees Toronto	1.02	1.00	1.00	
- Hotels, under 200 Employees (Toronto)	.98		.98	.85
- Restaurants (Toronto)	.86		.81	.87
- Restaurants (Ottawa)	.99		.90	1.07

Source: Canada Department of Labour, 1974 Survey of Wages and Working Conditions.

PAY RATIOS  
WITHIN  
ESTABLISHMENTS

While the ratios in Tables 7 and 8 overcome many of the limitations of Census data, they still describe average relationships over groups of establishments. As such these ratios may be influenced by variations in pay practices among establishments. In order to isolate the female/male pay differences from such inter-establishment variations, an attempt was made to use the Canada Department of Labour survey data for deriving pay ratios for occupations within establishments in Ontario. It was decided that calculation of ratios would be meaningful only where the following conditions were met: (i) there were at least 5 males and 5 females in the occupation in the establishment; and (ii) females comprised not less than 10 per cent or more than 90 per cent of the total number of employees in the occupation in the establishment.

These conditions could not be met for several of the occupations shown in Tables 7 and 8, particularly the non-office occupations. In total, 25 occupations covering 58,967 employees met the conditions.

In 155 situations<sup>2</sup> (25 per cent of the total) the female/male pay ratio fell between .35 and .79 (see Table 9). In 358, or 57 per cent of the cases, the ratio was between 0.80 and 0.99. In the remaining 112 situations (18 per cent) the ratio was 1.00 or above.

The occupation "Clerk, General Office" was the occupation which occurred most frequently and had the widest range of female/male pay ratios. The pay ratio was .79 or less in about 34 per cent of the 309 cases, and 1.00 or above in 9 per cent of the situations. The ratio for "Salesperson" also ranged widely. About 33 per cent of the 72 establishments reporting for "Salesperson" had a ratio of up to 0.79 and 20 per cent had a ratio

<sup>2</sup> The observations to which these numbers refer are pay ratios for a particular occupation in a particular establishment. For some establishments data are available on several occupations, and each occupation-establishment situation is counted separately. Ratios which differ from 1.00 do not necessarily mean violations of present equal pay legislation, since even in these relatively narrowly defined occupation groups, males and females may not be doing 'substantially the same work.'

TABLE 9

Distribution of Female/Male Pay Ratios for  
Selected Occupations within Establishments  
Ontario, 1974

Occupation	Number of Employees		FEMALE/MALE PAY RATIO														Total No. of Observations
			0.35-0.44	0.45-0.54	0.55-0.64	0.65-0.69	0.70-0.74	0.75-0.79	0.80-0.84	0.85-0.89	0.90-0.94	0.95-0.99	1.00-1.09	1.10-1.19	1.20-1.29	1.30 & over	
Manager, Admin.	732	287	-	-	1	2	-	3	2	3	1	4	1	-	-	-	17
Systems Analyst	924	169	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	2	3	8	-	-	-	7
Programmer	700	249	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	8	10	-	-	-	21
Psychiatric Attendant	773	1,100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3	-	-	-	14
Diagnostic-Rad. Technician	50	118	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	10	-	-	-	8
Med.-Lab. Technologist	278	784	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	3	5	10	1	-	-	25
Med.-Lab. Technician	64	217	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2
Secretary	112	143	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	-	3	2	1	-	10
Cost Clerk	68	63	-	-	-	1	5	4	7	10	13	11	8	-	-	-	59
Accounting Clerk	799	853	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	1	-	-	-	6
Cashier Office	202	57	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	7
Computer Operator	376	289	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	3	1	-	-	4
Computer-Per. Eqp. Op.	153	173	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	2
Order Filler	15	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Stock Records Clerk	45	79	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Office Boy/Girl	489	556	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	5
Clerk, General Office	14,391	27,284	1	5	28	14	29	29	42	42	59	31	20	5	3	1	309
Order Clerk	96	101	1	3	2	5	6	8	2	2	4	-	2	-	-	-	11
Salesperson	1,132	2,835	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	3	9	8	9	4	1	1	72
Sales Clerk	1,302	420	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	10	2	-	2	-	-	-	15
Supervisor, Chefs & Cooks	22	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Cook	26	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2
Cook, Institution	9	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Cook, Helper	63	77	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Laundry Man/Woman	71	156	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	3	1	-	1	-	-	-	4
Total	22,892	36,075	2	8	32	23	42	48	80	89	104	85	92	13	5	2	625

Source: Unpublished data, 1974 Survey of Wages, Canada Department of Labour.

of 1.00 and above. The occupation "Psychiatric Attendant" recorded a ratio of 1.00 and above in 10 of 14 establishments and .95 or above in the others.

While the data presented above show that in a number of establishments female/male differentials in narrowly defined occupations are quite small, there is still no doubt that, on average, female wage rates are below those for males. In the somewhat arbitrarily selected set of occupations examined here the average ratio of female to male pay rates is .88.

SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL  
EVIDENCE ON MALE/  
FEMALE PAY  
DIFFERENTIALS

A few--but only a few--attempts have been made by other researchers to assess the extent to which the remaining differentials can be explained by such factors as age, education, seniority, unionization, productivity, and so on.<sup>3</sup> However, these studies have generally involved different occupations, different sources of data, different definitions, and different time periods. As such, it is not possible to draw many useful conclusions from this research. The principal conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter and other studies are:

- The difference between the distribution of female workers and that of male workers among major occupational groups accounted for less than one-sixth of the average female/male differential in annual earnings reported in the 1971 census. This finding is important, because a basic assumption underlying interest in equal pay for work of equal value is that much of the overall pay differential between men and women is the result of differences in occupational distribution, i.e., females being relatively more concentrated in low-paying occupations.

<sup>3</sup> The studies are S. Ostry, *The Female Worker in Canada*, 1961 Census Monograph, Statistics Canada, 1968; M. Gunderson, "Male-Female Wage Differentials and the Impact of Equal Pay Legislation", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, November, 1975; and R. A. Holmes, "Male-Female Earning Differentials in Canada", Simon Fraser University, Department of Economics and Commerce, Discussion paper 74-5-2, 1974. There has been very little systematic analysis of female/male wage differentials across a wide range of occupations in Canada. The study by Gunderson developed from work funded partially by the Ontario Ministry of Labour. Additional study is presently under way in the Ministry of Labour.

<sup>4</sup> Gunderson in  
<sup>5</sup> In the education

- . In general, pay rate differentials in narrowly defined occupations within establishments appear to be substantially less than differentials in annual earnings for broad occupational groups. On average, the pay rate differential within narrowly defined occupations within establishments appears to be about 10 to 20 per cent. This differential is significantly lower where unions exist, when there is an incentive pay system, and in larger establishments.<sup>4</sup>
- . While the data on age, education, and seniority are not available in the occupational wage rate surveys described above, it is likely that a portion of the female/male pay differentials within narrowly defined occupations are related to these factors.<sup>5</sup>

Further research is necessary to indicate the proportion of the over-all pay rate differential in narrowly defined occupations within establishments that is attributed to differences between females and males in their distribution among narrowly defined occupations. The principal difficulty in researching this question is that most data on employment and pay rates by sex for narrowly defined occupations is available only for somewhat arbitrarily selected occupations, not comprehensively like census data on annual earnings for occupational groups and classes. If it were found that female/male differences in distribution among narrowly defined occupations accounted for a substantial proportion of the over-all pay rate differential, then equal pay for work of equal value might contribute significantly to reducing the over-all female/male pay rate differential -- to the extent that jobs with different rates of pay could be shown to be of equal value. The problem of identifying jobs of equal value is the subject of the next chapter.

<sup>4</sup> Gunderson, pp. 466-468. In that study unionization accounted for about a ten percentage point reduction and incentive pay systems an eight percentage point reduction in the differential.

<sup>5</sup> In her analysis of 1961 Census data, Ostry found that about one-third to one-half of the annual earnings differential for full-time workers was related to age and education.

CHAPTER

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## CHAPTER TWO

## IDENTIFYING EQUAL VALUE JOBS

SECTION ONE:  
A MATTER OF VALUE

No discussion about Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value can exclude consideration of the basic but complex issue of what constitutes value. The ability to identify situations where jobs are, in fact, of equal value is a necessary prerequisite to ensuring equal pay. Such an ability implies, in turn, some consideration and common understanding of what is meant by "value" and how it can be measured.

LOOKING FOR A  
DEFINITION

Such understanding can be elusive. A precise and unequivocal definition of the term "value" is difficult to formulate because of the element of subjectivity which surrounds it. Two broad approaches are possible: to regard "value" as the monetary worth of an item as established by the market, or to regard it as something which in some sense is "fair" or "equitable". Most standard dictionary definitions of "value" imply these two approaches. The Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary alternately defines "value" as "a fair return or equivalent in goods, services or money for something exchanged"; "the monetary worth of something--marketable price"; "relative worth, utility or importance".

Clearly, it would be easy not to get beyond the issue of definition itself. Yet it is imperative to arrive at some consensus definition if judgments of equality are to be made. In addition, any empirical analysis of such matters as the existence of jobs of equal value with unequal rates of pay, or the effects of "equality" on pay structures, is impossible without such a measure of value. Our attempt here is to expose and explore some dimensions of the problem.

THE ECONOMIC  
PERSPECTIVE

The Theory of Value has been one of the most fundamental questions to which economists have addressed themselves. They have managed to resolve the issue by giving value one precise meaning. For economists, "The value of any commodity (or service) is the amount of some other commodity or service for which it will exchange in the market".<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Company, 1975, p. 1292.

<sup>2</sup> Vincent Bladen, *From Adam Smith to Maynard Keynes: The Heritage of Political Economy*, University of Toronto Press, 1974, p. 9.

The obvious advantage of such a definition is that it is at once precise, observable, and measurable. Unfortunately, however, it is not a particularly helpful definition of value as it relates to equal pay for work of equal value. Neither does it speak to the question of equal value between jobs.

The economic definition of value implies that jobs are of equal value if the rates of pay are equal. According to this definition, the market automatically gives us equal pay for work of equal value because that is how value is defined.

Although the economists' definition of value is obviously not what the proponents of equal pay for work of equal value have in mind, it is important to appreciate the economist's perspective. It is from such a perspective that has come some of the confusion surrounding discussion of the concept of equal pay for work of equal value, and the occasional impression that the professional economist is opposed to the idea.

In a larger context, however, the writings on the Theory of Value in economics do have a contribution to make to any discussion of the issue of equal pay for work of equal value. It is generally recognized that the values determined by the market may not be ethically fair, socially desirable, or even practically efficient in motivating effort. There has been sufficient recognition of the role played by monopoly forces and power blocs in determining prices and wages, as to discredit belief in the market in many quarters. Governments have intervened to impose various restrictions and regulations on the market process.

Indeed, with regard to equal pay legislation itself, the Supreme Court in the United States ruled that appeal to facts of the market was not an adequate defense since "just such disparities were what Congress intended to correct by this legislation."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Peter J. Brennan, *Secretary of Labour vs. City Stores, Inc.*, No. 72-2382, May 29, 1973, p. 11. It should be noted that in this case the Supreme Court was ruling on whether two jobs involved "equal work" not whether the jobs were of "equal value". The issue of government intervention in the labour market directed toward equal value rather than equal work is discussed in Chapter 3.

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But it is much easier to discuss the inadequacies of the values generated by the market, than to arrive at an alternative approach to defining value. Even followers of Marx have never been able to derive from the Labour Theory of Value a practical scientific means for estimating the value of goods produced according to the types and amounts of labour used in producing them.<sup>4</sup>

An alternate approach to determining value is to move from using an external "objective" indicator, such as the market, to an internal "subjective" indicator such as the individual. It is unlikely, however, that all persons involved in a given situation will agree on how the value of particular jobs should be measured. The best that can be hoped for is a limited consensus. Such a consensus must reflect the relative power of the different groups and viewpoints which are represented. While it may be quite desirable and even possible, in a given situation, to alter the balance of power among the groups involved and to change some of the perceptions, it is quite another matter to pretend that such judgments are or can be totally objective or scientific.

Based on the two extremes of using external/objective and internal/subjective indicators to define value, it would appear that an ideal compromise would be to have, in a given situation, an external objective authority capable of reflecting a consensus of the internal subjective thoughts and feelings of all those involved. The most widely used and best known process for producing measures of the content of jobs which are acceptable to all or more persons involved in a given situation is job evaluation. The next section of this chapter describes the basic methods of job evaluation and explores the potential for using job evaluation to identify "equal value" jobs for purposes of achieving greater equity in the wage structure.

THE INDIVIDUAL  
AS ARBITER

STRIVING FOR AN  
OBJECTIVE PROCESS

<sup>4</sup> Joan Robinson, *Economic Philosophy*, Penguin Series, 1964, pp. 43-47.

SECTION TWO:  
JOB EVALUATION &  
EQUAL VALUE

Job evaluation has been described as "... an attempt to determine and compare the demands that normal performance of particular jobs makes on normal workers without taking account of the individual abilities or performance of the workers concerned...it means the comparison of jobs by the use of formal and systematic procedures in order to determine the relative position of one job to another in a wage or salary hierarchy."<sup>5</sup>

DETERMINING THE  
VALUE OF JOBS

As this description implies, job evaluation is impersonal, concerned solely with the investigation and comparison of jobs on the basis of job content. In this context, it deals with relationships between jobs, and not with absolute measures.

Two additional characteristics of job evaluation need to be made explicit: 1) although it involves the application of a series of systematic and orderly procedures, job evaluation is dependent to some degree, on the exercise of subjective judgement; 2) while it may be used as an aid to determining relative wages and developing a basic wage rate or salary structure, it does not indicate what level of pay should or will be associated with a specific job or group or jobs.

JOB EVA  
METHODS

THE JOB EVALUATION  
PROCESS

Despite wide diversity among job evaluation schemes currently in use, generally, the following elements are part of any job evaluation process:

*Job analysis* This is a detailed study of jobs in the organization. The aim is to record what duties the job-holders perform, how they perform them, the demands of the job, and the work objectives. The result is the preparation of written job descriptions which record, in a standardized form, the information on each job, to be used in subsequent stages of the evaluation process.

*Selection of compensable factors* to be used in the comparison of jobs. These factors form the yardsticks which are used to determine the relative position of different jobs in the job hierarchy. They may be specified quite broadly

<sup>5</sup> David W. Belcher, *Compensation Administration*, Prentice-Hall Inc., New Jersey, 1974, p. 88.

(for example, "skill", "effort", "responsibility"), or more finely (for example, "skill" may be subdivided into "education", "experience", "dexterity", etc.). The job descriptions themselves may be of considerable assistance in identifying which grouping of factors seems most appropriate in a particular situation. Ideally, the factors chosen should possess certain characteristics - for example, each should be present to some degree in all jobs examined, although preferably not to the *same* degree in all jobs; the choice of factors should be based on a consensus view, reflecting both the employer's and employees' perception of what constitute the essential elements in a job; the factors should, as far as possible, be independent of each other, so that they do not simply describe the same thing in a number of different ways.

*Selection of job evaluation method*, and the use of this system to evaluate the jobs under review. In some situations, a ready-made scheme may already be available; in others, it may be more appropriate to develop a tailor-made scheme.

In practice, most existing job evaluation schemes are based on one of four primary job evaluation methods. Any of these methods may be modified or used to produce a composite scheme utilizing elements drawn from any of the others. The four basic methods are:

The Ranking Method

The Classification Method

The Factor-Comparison Method

The Points-Rating Method.

*Ranking* is perhaps the simplest of all methods to install and explain. Following preparation of job descriptions and selection of factors, jobs are simply ranked, in order, from highest to lowest, on the basis of the descriptions provided. Generally speaking, it is most useful where only a limited number of jobs are being evaluated, and the number of factors being considered is small. Moreover, because the evaluator is generally required to keep the "whole job" in mind, it is often judged desirable that he, or she, possesses a reasonably detailed knowledge of the jobs in question. For these

#### JOB EVALUATION METHODS

reasons, the method is assumed to be primarily applicable to small organizations or within departments in larger organizations. It has sometimes been criticized as inviting the intrusion of conscious or unconscious bias on the part of the evaluator, who may be overly influenced by considerations such as the present pay rate associated with a job, or the performance of the current job incumbent.

*Job Classification* involves defining a number of classes or grades of jobs, and then fitting each job into the appropriate class on the basis of the job description. Its major advantage is generally regarded as the high degree of flexibility which it permits. However, it is difficult to formulate the grade descriptions adequately, and of necessity it involves the exercise of a considerable degree of judgment in its application. As with the ranking method described above, it tends to consider the "whole job", and the various compensable factors used are accorded equal weight. In order, therefore, to take adequate account of the different amounts of a factor which may be present in different jobs, the grade descriptions must be written with sufficient precision to allow these variations to be distinguished. Although often suggested as being most appropriate for relatively small organizations with few jobs, or for separate application to different types of job, the classification method has been used widely and successfully in the U.S. Government Service for many years.<sup>6</sup>

*Factor-Comparison* initially proceeds, like the other methods described, with job analysis and the preparation of job descriptions. From these a job specification is prepared, written in terms of the compensable factors chosen. (In its original form, this method utilized five basic factors, felt to be common to virtually all jobs: "mental requirements", "physical requirements", "skill requirements", "responsibility", and "working conditions"). The next step is to select a number of "key jobs", to be used as reference points in the subsequent evaluation. These jobs are ranked, in turn, under each of the five factors. Next, the present wage rate paid on each key

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<sup>6</sup> Belcher, p. 150.

job is divided into separate money amounts for each factor. The resulting two scales are then compared; if they are badly "out of line" for certain jobs, those jobs may be rejected for use as benchmarks. In other cases, marginal adjustments may be made to bring the scales into closer alignment by transferring money amounts from one factor heading to another. Following this step, a job comparison scale is drawn up, using the "corrected" money scales. Each key job is entered on a chart alongside the appropriate monetary value, and under the appropriate factor heading. In other words using five factors, each key job will appear five times in the job comparison scale--once under each factor heading. The remaining jobs to be evaluated are then compared, factor by factor, with the benchmark jobs, and inserted into the appropriate position in the job comparison scale.

Obviously, the factor-comparison method is very complex. It also relies crucially on the selection of "genuine" benchmark jobs, and on the substantial "correctness" of their associated existing pay rates. Further problems arise if the content of these jobs gradually changes over a period of time. However, by its nature, the method involves use of a custom-built scheme in each situation; this is advantageous in the sense that the method can be adapted easily to fit the actual circumstances of the organization in question. Use of a limited number of factors reduces the possibility of "overlap", although it is possible that the same five, "universal" factors may not be appropriate in all situations. Integration of job evaluation and job pricing is cited as an advantage by some proponents of the method, although use of actual money values runs the danger that ratings may be unconsciously biased if the present wage-rates of all jobs are known in advance. Several of the disadvantages of the factor-comparison method have been reduced by a number of modifications made to the original design of the scheme, including the conversion of money values to percentage point distributions at an early stage in the evaluation. Factor-comparison methods have also been used successfully in

combination with techniques deriving from other schemes, especially points-rating.

The *Points-Rating* method involves breaking jobs down into several compensable factors, assigning numerical values (points) to each of these factors according to the degree to which these factors are present in each job, and summing these points to obtain a total value for the job. Usually the factors are accorded unequal weights, in recognition of the fact that some factors are felt to be more important than others. Different types of jobs are usually evaluated using different compensable factors with separate weighting patterns. An example of this is the frequent use of separate schemes for manual and clerical jobs. Use of different factors and weighting patterns allows the evaluation scheme to be designed in such a way as to be most sensitive to the essential elements required in the performance of each group of jobs (e.g., "physical effort" may be an important factor in schemes for certain manual workers, but not utilized at all in schemes for clerical workers). The high degree of stability inherent in the method allows points-rating schemes to be used over relatively long periods of time without substantial revision; new jobs can be evaluated (or changed jobs re-evaluated) relatively easily, and inserted into the appropriate position in the job hierarchy. The major disadvantage appears to be the high initial development costs of a points-rating scheme, although these may be largely avoided by using a ready-made scheme, several of which are available. Points-rating is by far the most popular method of job evaluation; in the U.S.A. it appears to be used more frequently than all other methods combined.<sup>7</sup>

QUANTITATIVE &  
NON-QUANTITATIVE  
SCHEMES

The ranking and classification methods of job evaluation are sometimes referred to as *Non-Quantitative* (or *Non-Analytical*) schemes, because they produce simple job rankings only. On the other hand, factor-classification and points-rating methods are *Quantitative* schemes,

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<sup>7</sup> This is likely true of Canada as well, but to our knowledge there has been no survey of the extent of use of the various methods of job evaluation in Canada.

because, in addition to rankings, they also provide a numerical measure of the distance between ranks. In general, quantitative schemes are often felt to be the more suitable for application to complex job structures. Also, because they involve making several separate judgments for each job and quantifying them, they are said to be more precise and less subject to intrusion of conscious or unconscious bias on the part of the evaluator. Of the two quantitative schemes described above, points-rating is preferred by some on grounds that it more explicitly separates the evaluation process itself from the eventual determination of pay levels. However, all schemes, quantitative or non-quantitative, possess their own particular advantages and disadvantages, and it does not seem necessary to argue that any one is consistently superior to the others in all types of situation. Obviously selection of the most appropriate method is an important element in the job evaluation process. This choice will be influenced by such considerations as the size of the organization in question, the number and nature of the jobs to be evaluated, organizational goals, the aspirations and desires of the employees involved, availability of resources for performing the evaluation, the nature of the present wage structure, and so on.

It is clear that installation of a job evaluation system can be of benefit to both employer and employee. It provides a series of reference points upon which to base rational and consistent decisions about wage and salary differentials; it focusses attention on those aspects of jobs which are regarded as most important for successful job performance; and, among other benefits, it possesses the potential for increasing the scope of employer and employee negotiation of conditions of employment in the workplace.

It is also clear, however, that job evaluation will not automatically guarantee equality, and that the job

evaluation process itself is vulnerable to many of the same influences which currently affect wage determination without job evaluation.

*SOME LIMITATIONS  
OF THE SYSTEM  
ITSELF...*

As mentioned earlier, job evaluation is an aid to determining relative wages and developing a basic wage rate or salary structure. It must be kept in mind, however, that wages represent only one part of any total compensation package.<sup>8</sup> In addition, it is unlikely, in practice, that wages will reflect only the results of job evaluation.

For example, employers will be concerned to maintain a balance between the internal wage structure (i.e., the relationships between the wages paid for different jobs within the organization) and the external wage structure (i.e., the relationship between the wage paid within the organization, and the wage offered by competitors in the labour market, for similar types of work). This will be particularly important if the organization recruits certain occupational groups from outside, rather than training workers for these positions internally. It will not always be the case that the internal relative wage differentials suggested by a job evaluation exercise are in conformity with the wage differentials between similar jobs in the external labour market. Reconciliation of these conflicts may initially require certain "adjustments" to be made to internal wage differentials; over a period of time, as labour market supply and demand conditions change, further adjustments may be required. Obviously, if this process is repeated with some regularity, the principle of equal pay, based on the results of job evaluation, will be placed in jeopardy.

Also mentioned earlier, was the element of subjective judgment involved in the job evaluation process. This

<sup>8</sup> Other elements may be included such as cost of living payments, seniority bonuses, merit payments, incentive bonuses, shift and overtime premiums, and any number of so-called "fringe" benefits such as paid vacation, employer contributions to pension and insurance plans, and so on.

<sup>9</sup> It is to be noted that (such as) traditional which effective This becomes as a See Relat

is particularly evident in connection with selection of compensable factors and the "weighting" pattern associated with these factors, as well as in their application to the ranking of the jobs being evaluated.<sup>9</sup> Some of these problems may be reduced by including on the job evaluation committee, representatives of both management and the employees, in order that a broad consensus view may be obtained. In a collective bargaining situation, several of these more subjective points will be matters of negotiation between employer and union in drawing up the detailed job evaluation plan to be used. In addition, negotiation will take place on the translation of the job evaluation results into a money wage and salary structure. With the possible exception of the factor-comparison method as originally devised, none of the job evaluation schemes commonly used incorporate any set formula for translation of job "values" into a resultant money wage rate. Under a points-rating scheme, for example, whether one job which receives twice as many "points" as another is accorded a wage-rate which is twice as high, is strictly a matter of judgment or negotiation.

The point of these remarks is to illustrate that although use of job evaluation may add a new dimension to the determination of relative wage differentials, this process may nevertheless still be influenced by many of the same factors which currently play a prominent role in wage determination in the absence of job evaluation.

<sup>9</sup> It has sometimes been alleged that many existing job evaluation schemes have worked to the disadvantage of women because of the systematic "undervaluation" of factors (such as dexterity, speed, etc.) which play a prominent role in many of the jobs traditionally performed by women. In part, this may be connected with the emphasis which job evaluation methodology places on the demands of a job rather than on the effects of these demands on the workers.

This problem has attracted considerable attention in West Germany, for example, because of the widespread use of "light work" and "heavy work" job classifications as a means of avoiding many of the implications of observing the equal pay principle. See "West German Government Report on Job Evaluation Systems" in *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 23, November 1975.

AND SOME POTENTIAL  
ABUSES

Job evaluation is not an exact science. It is a tool and, as such, its effectiveness can be a function of the integrity of the user. Job evaluation could be used, if desired, to justify, or rationalize, a wide variety of different wage structures for a given group of jobs, depending on the relative weights accorded to different compensable factors, for example.

Past research has revealed that, in many cases, use of various alternative job evaluation methods yields substantially similar job rankings, if the exercise is conducted in good faith, and without prejudice. Yet the fact is that situations may arise in which there are strong pressures on employers, employees, or both, to manipulate job evaluation schemes in order to produce particular results. Many job evaluation practitioners stress that, if a job evaluation scheme is to be workable, the results must be acceptable to the vast majority of workers who are covered by it. For this reason, schemes are often rejected if they result in changes which are unacceptable to a large number of workers, or if the changes are too costly for the employer. Both problems, cost and acceptability, suggest that job evaluation may encounter severe limitations if it seeks to affect too radical a change in an existing wage structure. Yet situations where present wage differentials appear to be strongly "discriminatory" are precisely the situations where changes are needed to bring about greater equity in the wage structure.

JOB EVALUATION AND  
EQUAL PAY FOR WORK  
OF EQUAL VALUE

In spite of the limitations of job evaluation discussed above, it seems likely - though no proof exists - that its application to situations where it is presently not used could serve to reduce inequities in pay for work of equal value and, consequently, some existing male/female wage disparities. However, it is difficult to obtain even approximate quantitative estimates of the extent or scope of such reductions. To our knowledge, no studies of the effect of introduction of job evaluation systems on sex wage differentials have ever been carried out.

The above discussion of job evaluation would seem to imply that the effect of job evaluation on male/female wage differentials will depend upon the type of system that is used and how it is applied. This suggests that if job evaluation is to be used in any way to bring about greater equity in pay between men and women there should be some generally accepted guidelines governing its use. Development of such guidelines should address the following issues:

- The necessity, desirability, or practicability, of specifying guidelines which attempt to define what constitutes a "legitimate" (or "illegitimate") use of job evaluation techniques for purposes of adhering to the equal pay for work of equal value principle.
- The degree to which guidelines should place constraints upon, or otherwise influence the translation of job evaluation results into a money wage rate;  
Specific guidelines for determination of job values may be ineffective, or even irrelevant, if arbitrary translation into a pay scale is done;
- Assuming workable solutions to the above problems, appropriate approaches to those other elements of compensation not amenable to job evaluation techniques might need to be considered as separate issues;
- The problem of "linking" separate job evaluation schemes for different types of work (e.g., clerical, as opposed to manual, work). This may be of importance because of the widespread segregation of males and females, at present, into different broad occupational groupings;

- The latter problem is, in fact, one aspect of a much wider concern--namely, the specification of an appropriate "comparison unit" for establishment of equal pay for work of equal value. For example, should this be attempted within departmental groups only, broad types of workgroup only (such as "clerical", "manual", "managerial", etc.), or over the whole establishment, company, or even industry? Generally, the more narrowly the comparison unit is defined, the less effective is observance of the "equal value" principle likely to be in reducing male/female wage disparities, and the greater the scope for contravention of the spirit of this principle. On the other hand, choice of broadly based comparison units is constrained by difficulties in developing suitable job evaluation schemes for general application, and by the scope of most collective bargaining units as currently defined.
- The degree to which exceptions to the "equal value" principle are necessary or acceptable - for example, for labour market reasons (discussed in Chapter 3).

### CHAPTER THREE: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF EQUAL PAY FOR WORK OF EQUAL VALUE

#### SECTION ONE: INCREASED GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN WAGE DETERMINATION

As discussed in Chapter 2, section 2, achievement of equal pay for work of equal value presupposes the existence of some formal process or system for comparing seemingly unlike jobs. The nature of the job evaluation process presupposes also the existence of some procedure(s) designed to resolve disputes arising from alleged misapplication of job evaluation methods.

To the extent that such formal processes for comparison of jobs would be required by government, rather than merely encouraged or assisted, equal pay for work of equal value would carry with it a presumption of increased intervention by government in the collective bargaining and wage determination process. The degree and extent of such intervention would obviously depend on the way in which the equal value requirement were formulated, and on how stringently it were applied. If there are no controls over the content of a job evaluation system, and free choice is allowed in the selection of job evaluation methods, the system becomes vulnerable to abuse.

In addition, if the equal value principle is confined solely to ensuring equality of pay for *jobs* of equal value, with no consideration given to the pay differences between jobs of slightly unequal value, the spirit of the equal value principle can be contravened.

Such arguments, of course, also raise the more general question of whether increased government intervention in the wage determination process is either desirable, or acceptable. Reactions to the Federal Government's heightened role in this area since the anti-inflation controls took effect in October 1975, suggest that no broad consensus presently exists on this question.

#### WHERE JOB EVALUATION EXISTS

Although there appear to be no reliable quantitative estimates available on the existence of job evaluation schemes in Ontario, it seems clear that job evaluation methods are widely used, especially in larger organizations. Where these schemes are subject to joint

regulation by trade unions and employers as part of the collective bargaining process, it could be argued that this fact, in itself, may constitute sufficient protection against abuse of job evaluation methods. Certainly it places some constraints on the exercise of subjective judgment in the course of performing a job evaluation, as well as on the process of eventually translating the results into a money wage structure. However, it was argued earlier that in certain situations some conflicts of interest may develop, both between employer and employees, and within the employee group itself, when attempts are made to apply the equal pay for work of equal value principle. Where job evaluation already exists, such conflicts may have been resolved by a process of compromise, made possible, in part, because the evaluation itself was performed with a variety of aims in mind. In this way, some existing job evaluation wage structures might conceivably contravene the equal value principle, simply because the job evaluation results were subject to amendment in order to achieve other aims, in the process of developing a workable wage structure. If the reduction of female/male wage disparities becomes the *dominant* goal of a job evaluation exercise, the scope of compromise is lessened, unless specific exceptions to the equal value principle are allowed.

WHERE NO JOB  
EVALUATION EXISTS

The major problems, however, relate to the application of equal pay for work of equal value to situations where no system of job evaluation is currently used. These situations are probably in the majority (in terms of the *number of establishments* involved), and may include a number of intractable cases where job evaluations have been considered in the past but rejected because of the difficulties encountered. If the authorities charged with enforcement of the equal value principle were required to perform their own evaluations in these cases, the administrative burdens could prove substantial.

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Despite the fact that several countries now have equal pay legislation which makes specific reference to equal pay for work of equal value, examination of the legislation itself, and the way it has been interpreted, indicate a widespread lack of distinction between equal pay for equal work (that is, the same, or substantially similar, work) and equal pay for work of equal value. Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, by which the European Economic Community (EEC) was established, refers only to "equal remuneration for *equal work*". This phrase has been interpreted quite narrowly by some member countries, but more widely by others (to include, for example, cases where jobs have been equally valued under a job evaluation scheme). In the past few years, the European Commission has made increased efforts to bring the equal pay legislation of member countries into closer alignment particularly in regard to providing access for all employees, whether or not covered by collective agreements, to means of legal redress for alleged equal pay infractions. The 1970 Equal Pay Act in Great Britain forbids the setting of separate female/male pay scales in collective agreements, and provides for equal pay for "substantially similar" work, or for work to which equal value has been attributed under a job evaluation system. The Act contains no requirement to introduce job evaluation where none presently exists. The Irish Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act of June 1974 makes similar provisions, although it is not very specific on the definition of "equal value". However, experience in operating a similar arrangement under the 1972 National Agreement suggests that arguments for equal pay based on the "equal value" provision will be required to put forward evidence derived from the results of a job evaluation exercise.<sup>1</sup> In Italy the 1948 Constitution guarantees women "equal pay for equal work"; similarly, the West German Federal Constitution of 1949

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<sup>1</sup> "Equal Pay in Ireland: A Progress Report", *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 11, November 1974.

has been interpreted in the courts as providing the same guarantee. The 1974 Equal Pay Regulation in Luxembourg specifically refers to "equal pay for the same work or for work of equal value". In 1975, the Dutch Government, following a long period of resistance to equal pay legislation, finally succumbed to pressure from the European Commission, and introduced an Equal Pay Act which provides for equal pay for work of equal value (with "equal value" to be determined according to a "reasonable" system of job evaluation). Belgium, in 1952 was the first of the present EEC members to ratify I.L.O. Convention 100, which refers to "equal remuneration for work of equal value" yet, up to 1967, workers not covered by collective agreements had no means of legal redress in lodging equal pay complaints. In fact, present equal pay legislation in Belgium (1971 Employment Act) is still vaguely worded, referring to "the principle of equal remuneration for males and females". Finally in France, an Act of December 1972, provides for "equal remuneration for work of equal value", but makes no specific clarification of this point other than to disallow collective agreements from setting separate pay scales by sex, and disallowing use of separate job evaluation schemes for men and women.

It is difficult to judge the likely effectiveness of many of these pieces of legislation, partly because some are of very recent application, and also because few include any specific definitions of what is meant by "equal work" or "equal value". Undoubtedly the legislative wording leaves a great deal of interpretation to the courts. However, there is a strong presumption that where "equal value" is concerned, a great deal of reliance is placed on the *voluntary* adoption of job evaluation, which may leave many areas of employment virtually untouched by the legislation. In addition, there is little indication as to whether the detailed provisions of job evaluation are taken at face value, or may be questioned.

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AND EXPERIENCE IN  
OTHER COUNTRIES

There are signs that several jurisdictions, especially those within the EEC, have been attempting to move, albeit warily, more in the direction of the equal value concept than was previously the case. A major reason for this is the increasing recognition that a narrowly based equal pay concept is severely circumscribed in its application where, as is usually the case, there is considerable segregation in job roles between males and females.

Most countries appear to have made progress largely in the area of removing sex discriminatory pay provisions from collective agreements, and generally instilling the principle that pay rates be established using a single set of criteria for both sexes. However, there seems to be quite widespread recognition that real progress toward equal pay for work of equal value has been slow and somewhat disappointing.<sup>2</sup> Substantial female/male wage differentials continue to exist for a wide variety of reasons, but the failure to define adequately terms in the legislation itself, and to recognize fully the numerous possibilities for evasion, are almost certainly partially responsible.

Experience in other jurisdictions also suggests that female/male *earnings* differentials may often be "restored", even where pay *rates* have been equalized, by payment of a wide variety of bonuses (such as those based on productivity, or on continuous length of service in an organization) and premia for overtime and shiftwork. Although rarely discriminatory in the sense that separate amounts are authorized for males and females, many of these additions to pay rates do nevertheless contribute to female/male earnings differences because, for a variety of social and cultural reasons, men are often in a better position to take advantage of these extra earnings opportunities.

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<sup>2</sup> For brief summaries on progress towards equal pay in the various jurisdictions mentioned here, see *European Industrial Relations Review*, Nos. 22 (Belgium), 15 (Luxembourg), 11 (Ireland), 10 (West Germany), 17 (Denmark), 20 (France), 24 (U.K.), 19 (Italy) and 16 (Netherlands).

Further explanations for the very limited progress in reducing sex-based wage differences by legislative means include the inadequacy of resources provided for inspection and enforcement purposes. In fact, the resources required may be considerable, especially if legislation is based on the equal value rather than the equal work provision.

The very limited progress made by other countries toward achieving the goal of equal pay for work of equal value, attests to the actual and potential problems which are involved in and attend its enforcement, and to the long time periods required to change public attitudes.

Many of these countries have a history of much greater intervention in the bargaining and wage determination processes, than has been the case in Canada. Despite this, many of the obstacles relating to intervention for purposes of attaining equal pay for work of equal value remain to be overcome.

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SECTION TWO:  
EQUAL VALUE AND  
THE LABOUR MARKET

In the course of dealing with wage restraints and income policies, several European countries have had experiences with government intervention in the wage determination process. Some of these countries have carried out extensive analyses of the effects of intervention, and of the extent to which it is possible to alter wage structures without seriously affecting the distribution of labour.

While equal pay for work of equal value involves a different kind of intervention in the wage sphere than do wage controls and incomes policy, in the absence of any substantial experience with government policies to achieve equal pay for work of equal value,<sup>3</sup> it is useful to look at some of the European experience with other types of government intervention.

DETERMINING  
RELATIVE WAGES

Equal pay for work of equal value implies an attempt to determine relative wages for dissimilar jobs on the basis of inherent characteristics of the jobs and not on the basis of supply and demand conditions.

If the equal value concept is applied at the establishment level, it may result in assigning the same value to two jobs which are generally paid at different rates in the local labour market. Suppose, for example, that the predominant wage for painters in a given locality is \$8.00 per hour and that for bakers is \$6.00 per hour, and that a job evaluation process determines the jobs to be of equal value. In that case the employer would have to pay painters and bakers equally. If both are paid \$6.00, it may be very difficult for the firm to recruit or retain painters. If both are paid \$8.00, competing employers may find it difficult to retain bakers. If an evaluation process in other estab-

<sup>3</sup> As discussed in the previous section, careful reading of the legislation in most other jurisdictions suggests a concept closer to "equal work" as it occurs in existing Ontario legislation than to the "equal value" concept as used in this paper.

lishments rates painters and bakers differently than in the first establishment (perhaps rating bakers higher than painters), the two establishments may not be able to compete for bakers or painters by altering wage rates offered.

In the extreme case where many firms which employ the same occupational groups have different evaluation systems, the competitive wage rate mechanism by which labour is allocated among employers would cease to operate, and would have to be replaced by other mechanisms, e.g., non-pecuniary incentives or government direction--or else there would have to be some tampering with the job evaluation systems. While this extreme case may sound far-fetched, it appears that at times Canadian firms with job evaluation systems have had to alter the systems or pay higher rates than those indicated by the system in order to recruit and retain certain occupational groups (e.g., skilled tradesmen in the steel industry).

It might seem that this problem could be overcome by having the same job evaluation principles, or system, apply to all establishments. However, this would not solve the problem, because the weights for particular job characteristics would remain fixed as supply and demand conditions changed. Employers could, therefore, not alter the relative wages offered for particular jobs when the relative scarcities of workers in these occupations changed. It was this type of problem which led to the breakdown of the guided wage policy in the Netherlands in the 1960's.<sup>4</sup>

#### THE NETHERLANDS EXPERIENCE

The Netherlands experience in this matter is instructive because no other country has made such widespread use of job evaluation,<sup>5</sup> and in no other country has confidence

<sup>4</sup> "Wage Policies, Inflation and Industrial Relations", *O.E.C.D. Observer*, No. 76, July-August, 1975, p. 18.

<sup>5</sup> Martin P. Oettinger, "Nation-wide Job Evaluation in the Netherlands", *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 1, October 1964, p. 52.

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in the effectiveness of governmental intervention in wage determination been stronger or lasted longer.<sup>6</sup>

Netherlands wage policy during the period 1945-1959 allotted the same Government-set percentage increases to all workers in all industries except where higher increases could be justified by (a) demonstrated evidence of increased productivity, or (b) elimination of wage inequities demonstrated by evidence based on an approved formal system of job evaluation.<sup>7</sup>

The effect of this policy was to generate widespread interest in and adoption of job evaluation systems. Because the multitude of job evaluation systems made comparison difficult, if not impossible, equity concerns led trade unions to call for a single method of job evaluation. By 1948, a "normalized" point-rating method of job evaluation was developed and was soon in "almost universal" use.<sup>8</sup>

According to Oettinger the weights used in the "normalized" system were based not only on intrinsic properties of jobs, but also on supply and demand conditions which prevailed in 1948. These weights were not revised, and:

To the extent that the weights fail to reflect current scarcities of skills, the wage structure fails to induce entry into a given trade in the desired quantities. The rigid use of an outmoded system makes it impossible for individual industries to counteract labour market scarcities by raising wages. Conversely, where the pay is too high, the system produces an over-abundance of people with the requisite skills.<sup>9</sup>

Oettinger is critical of the Netherlands system for not permitting frequent changes of the weights in response to changes in supply and demand. However, changing the

<sup>6</sup> Erik Schiff, *Incomes Policies Abroad*, American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 1971, p. 15.

<sup>7</sup> Ellen M. Bussey, "Recent Wage Control Policy in the Netherlands", *Monthly Labour Review*, Vol. 87, May, 1964, pp. 517-518.

<sup>8</sup> Oettinger, "Nation-wide Job Evaluation", p. 48.

<sup>9</sup> Oettinger, p. 51.

weights in the normalized job evaluation system could not have restored labour market balance in all occupations, since it is likely that for some occupations, particular weights would have had to be increased, and for others the same weights would have had to be decreased.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the idea of altering weights for various job characteristics seems to be inconsistent with an underlying principle of job evaluation, i.e., with the notion of determining relative values of jobs on the basis of intrinsic characteristics of the jobs. Such tampering with weights is part of the phenomenon of "wages politics", attempting to alter a "scientific process" to generate politically desired results. In the Netherlands this was done for at least three industries. In response to the housing shortage and strike threats, the Board of Mediators allowed "the twisting and stretching of points" to grant increases to the building trades. The coal-miners also were allowed to bend the ordinary procedures under threat by the Catholic People's Party Cabinet Ministers to resign. Adjustments were made also on behalf of the merchant marine and K.L.M. to prevent severe losses in personnel to foreign companies.<sup>11</sup>

Commenting on importance of such concessions, Oettinger has remarked that:

The willingness of Berger /the Chairman of the Board of Mediators/ and his Board to bend with the pressures--occasionally it required ministerial intervention, as in the construction industry case in 1957--is without doubt responsible for the excellent record of industrial peace in the Netherlands in the

<sup>10</sup> Under certain conditions, it might be possible to determine the exact weights for which the wage structure resulting from a formal job evaluation system would be identical to the existing wage structure. However, since the number of occupations is likely to be substantially greater than the number of characteristics which are given weights in a job evaluation system, the appropriate set of equations would be over-determined in most cases.

<sup>11</sup> Oettinger, pp. 54-56.

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postwar years. It is, however, questionable whether a policy that relies on the ingenuity of one or a few persons to manipulate wage awards so as to keep the unions happy and at the same time assure continued national economic prosperity can really be called a "policy", quite apart from considerations regarding the efficacy of such a policy.<sup>12</sup>

Since 1963, the Netherlands has moved some distance away from controlled wage determination. The 1970 Wage Act upheld the principle that all wage contracts should first be fully negotiated between employers and employees, while authorizing the government to intervene in contracts it considers contrary to the national interest.

The Netherlands experience shows that in at least some cases, job evaluation principles had to be tempered in order to alleviate labour market imbalances. Experience of other countries with respect to wages policies also reveals numerous incidents where such policies have had to allow exceptions for labour market flexibility.<sup>13</sup>

#### WAGE FLEXIBILITY

#### AND

#### THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF LABOUR

In exploring the labour market implications of encouraging or requiring that relative wages be determined by job evaluation principles rather than by the market -- with all its imperfections -- it is necessary to consider the following questions:

- (1) To what extent are changes in relative wages necessary in order to achieve an efficient allocation of labour among firms, industries, occupations, and localities?
- (2) How much would application of the equal pay for work of equal value concept actually limit wage flexibility beyond what is needed for efficient allocation of labour, i.e., how many "exceptions" to equal pay for work of equal value would have to be allowed?

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<sup>12</sup> Oettinger, p. 57

<sup>13</sup> J. R. Crossley, "Collective Bargaining, Wage-Structure, and The Labour Market in the United Kingdom", in *Wage Structure in Theory and Practice*, edited by E. M. Hugh-Jones, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1966, pp. 184-192.

- (3) Could an acceptable mechanism be found for allowing necessary exceptions without undermining confidence in the equal pay for work of equal value principle?

There are many who argue with regard to the first question, that existing wage structures are influenced more by bargaining power, monopoly control, custom and accident than by competitive market forces. There has been a substantial amount of empirical research on this question, but the answers are inconclusive. An OECD study of Wages and Labour Mobility in ten countries (1965), states that the data are consistent with either hypothesis--that movements of labour are "preponderantly wage-insensitive" or that the wage-mechanism is so sensitive and powerful that only slight and temporary variations are required to effect substantial re-allocation of labour.<sup>14</sup>

In Sweden, the "wage solidarity" policy of the Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions has been, in part, justified by the argument that wage differentials do not serve "the function allotted in the pricing system to relative price and wage differences as a means of promoting mobility". Yet, as Johnston notes, there is little empirical evidence to support this argument.<sup>15</sup> After a survey of twenty-five years of studies of wage structures and the labour market in the U.K., J.R. Crossley concluded that

although the need for flexibility may have been overstated, it nonetheless exists and the problem of exceptions from a national wages policy is a real one.<sup>16</sup>

To the extent that such flexibility is needed with any system which seeks to establish or maintain relative

<sup>14</sup> *Wages and Labour Mobility*, OECD, Paris, 1965, p. 17

<sup>15</sup> T.L. Johnston, *Collective Bargaining in Sweden*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962, p. 329.

<sup>16</sup> J.R. Crossley, p. 189.

wages on the basis of principles other than the market, however imperfect that is, there would be a need to allow for exceptions from the equal pay for work of equal value principle for *bona fide* labour recruitment or retention problems. It is impossible to say how many exceptions would be necessary. It is even more difficult to say how many exceptions could be allowed without undermining public confidence in the just application of the equal pay for work of equal value principle. It appears that the difficulties of deciding how and when to allow exceptions from a national wage restraint program in response to labour recruitment and retention problems has been one of the most intractable problems in the operation of wage restraint and incomes policies.<sup>17</sup>

SUMMARY LABOUR  
MARKET IMPLICATIONS

Even where government policies which inhibit wage flexibility have included special provisions for exceptions to deal with labour recruitment and retention problems, there has been a recognized need for increased direct government involvement in the allocation of labour. Swedish manpower policy is the best illustration of this point. While it is widely known that Sweden has one of the more active manpower policies among OECD countries, little attention has been given to the fact that the trade unions' policy of wage solidarity--attempting to reduce and limit wage differentials--creates a need for a variety of types of government intervention in the labour market. Swedish trade union economists have long recognized that measures

<sup>17</sup> In the U.K. incomes policy in the 1960's, exceptions from the norm were permitted "where it is essential in the national interest to secure a change in the distribution of manpower (or to prevent a change which would otherwise take place) and a pay increase would be both necessary and effective for this purpose". Aubrey Jones, Chairman of the National Board for Prices and Incomes in the U.K. during 1965-70, remarked that the adjectives "necessary" and "effective" proved almost impossible to interpret, and accordingly exceptions were rarely allowed. (*The New Inflation*, Andre Deutch Limited, London, 1973, pp. 75-78.) The Anti-Inflation Program in Canada allows exemptions for situations where "for a period of three months or more, the job has been vacant, or a vacancy rate of at least twenty per cent has been experienced", and "there is a reasonable expectation that qualified employees can be recruited and retained at the higher salaries or wages" (Anti-Inflation Act Regulations, Part 4, Division 4, Schedule C, p. 60). However, there has not yet been any documented experience with this provision.

to promote labour mobility are essential when the market, via wage differentials, is not allowed to serve as the incentive to mobility. However, as Johnston notes there has been some concern in Sweden as to whether the policy of constraining wage differentials put too great a burden on manpower policy.<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately--and this applies to Canada, as well as Sweden--not enough is known about the role of wage differentials in the labour allocation process to be able to assess the degree to which particular policies that constrain wage flexibility would need to be accompanied by increased government involvement in the labour market. It would be even more difficult to speculate about whether the degree of government intervention in the labour market necessitated by policies that inhibit wage flexibility would be acceptable to the public.

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<sup>18</sup> T.L. Johnston, p. 329

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SECTION THREE:  
COST

As noted previously in this paper, it is impossible to estimate, at this time, the extent to which women are being paid less than men for work of equal value, or even to identify those situations where men and women are performing work of equal value.

Obviously, requiring equal pay for work of equal value would increase labour costs to the extent that wages and related benefits for women would have to be increased in situations where they are being paid less than men for work of equal value. However, such increases represent only a part of the potentially significant costs involved.

While we cannot make quantitative estimates of the costs of implementing the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, we can speculate about the nature and impact of such costs. In this section, we will look at relevant aspects of the United Kingdom experience, direct and indirect costs and their effects, and the relationship of these matters to the Federal government's Anti-Inflation Program.

THE U.K.  
EXPERIENCE

The Equal Pay Act, passed in 1970 in the U.K., came into effect in December 1975. The Department of Employment and Productivity attempted to estimate in advance the potential cost of introducing such legislation. It should be noted that since the U.K. legislation provides mainly for equal pay for "substantially the same" work, the Department's estimates pertain to changes in remuneration for persons performing substantially the same work.

ESTIMATES OF  
"DIRECT" COSTS

Employers in selected industries were asked to make estimates of the cost effects of introducing equal pay for women doing "the same work as men".<sup>19</sup> The employers had to make various assumptions about what constituted the "same" work. Estimates were obtained from 226 firms of 304 surveyed in 13 industries. The employers were

<sup>19</sup> "Cost of Equal Pay". *Employment and Productivity Gazette*. January 1970, pp. 4-6.

instructed to assume that the number of women employed and their hours worked remained constant. They were further asked to assume that women would receive the same hourly rates, overtime, shift, premium pay and bonuses as men. Benefits such as sick pay, pensions, and so on, were excluded from these estimates. The median increases constituted 35% of the earnings of women in manual jobs in food and clothing industries, 29% in engineering and electronics, 28% in retail distribution, 25% in laundries, and 14% in hotels and catering. The percentages of total pay were 18% in clothing, 13% in retail distribution, 11% for laundries, 8% for food, 2% for engineering and electronics, and 1% for hotels. On the basis of these figures, the Department estimated that direct costs would be about 3½% of the total national wage and salary bill.

SOME "INDIRECT"  
COSTS

Respondents to the U.K. study cited the following kinds of indirect costs which could result from introducing equal pay:

- Costs caused by the need to "maintain relativities", i.e., to increase the pay of women who did not qualify for equal pay type increases. This indirect cost could be substantial in industries where only a small proportion of females would have their wages increased as a direct consequence of equal pay.
- Costs caused as a result of competitive labour market processes. Firms whose employees were not affected by equal pay, would be forced to compete with those firms in their locality whose female employees were affected. This type of cost is difficult to estimate even in the framework of equal pay for the same work; it would be virtually impossible in the framework of equal pay for work of equal value.
- Costs caused by the need to equalize male wage rates in cases where males are being paid less than females in equal value jobs.

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The complexity of these cost impacts is illustrated by the following example. Suppose there are two jobs X and Y in Firm A, with men only on job Y and men and women on job X. Suppose also that the pay is highest for job Y. Now if a female complains that jobs X and Y are of equal value, and the complaint is upheld, then the employer will have to pay the men in job X as well as the women rates equal to that paid for job Y. Another employer B who has only men in job X may find that in order to compete he now has to pay all those men the higher job Y rate even if he doesn't employ anyone in job Y. If in addition Firm A has to raise its rates for females in another job Z in order to maintain the relationship with the rates for females in job X, then the rates for males in job Z may have to be increased in both Firm A and Firm B.

It is impossible to trace all such ramifications throughout the entire pay structure.

Obviously, such indirect costs are potentially great. Their effects are complex and even likely to outweigh those attributable to direct costs.

In view of such costs, it seems reasonable to assume that employers may try to deal with the issue of equal pay in ways which will reduce costs and minimize effects.

If in the above example, females comprise a small proportion of employment in job X, the employer might try to eliminate females from that job not so much to avoid increasing their wages, but to avoid increasing the wages of the men in the job. Rather than the overt action of dismissing females from job X or not replacing those who leave, the employer might restructure the jobs in his establishment to achieve the same result. In this way, the cost impact of equal pay is lessened, but at the price of negative implications for female employment. It is for this kind of reason that it sometimes is stated that equal pay legislation needs to be accompanied by strengthened equal opportunity measures.

SOME EFFECTS  
OF COST ON  
EMPLOYERS

In extreme cases, it is possible that the potential cost impacts of equal pay for work of equal value could exert some influence on investment decisions by companies. For example, a company likely to employ a relatively high proportion of female labour has some incentive, other things being equal, to locate in an area where female labour supply is plentiful and, therefore, prevailing female wage rates are not high. This can occur, in fact, even though the area concerned might be a high-wage area for males, simply because the present industrial structure is heavily biased towards work traditionally done by males. However, to the extent that a company moving into such an area would probably employ at least *some* males (and pay the prevailing wage rate for males in the locality), a requirement of equal pay for work of equal value could conceivably force the company to pay similar high rates for the females which it hires, even though their jobs are not at all similar to those of the males. Such a requirement may in this way influence the plant location decision.

A perhaps more striking example of this wage-transmission effect is provided by considering the likely effects of allowing "equal value" comparisons to be made between different establishments of the same company. Where the jobs concerned were of equal value, one consequence might be to require payment, at all locations, of the existing rate at the highest wage establishment. Although this might be justifiable in some cases, in others it could prove extremely disruptive and inflationary. Partly for this reason, equal pay legislation in most countries generally confines comparisons to the single establishment, or a commonly-owned group of establishments within the same locality. However, the recent Equal Pay Act in the Netherlands appears to be an exception to this rule, permitting comparisons between all enterprises within the same branch of industry.<sup>20</sup> It is probable that the

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<sup>20</sup> "Equal Pay in the Netherlands", *European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 16, April 1975.

enactment of this provision is closely related to the widespread use of the national job evaluation plan.

Where formal job evaluation systems exist, employers may also attempt to cushion the cost of equal pay by influencing the way certain jobs are rated in the system, as discussed in Chapter 2. To the extent that such tactics limit the cost impacts of equal value, they will also limit the extent to which pay disparities are altered.

THE LOCATION  
AND STRUCTURE  
OF INDUSTRY

The cost impact of introducing equal pay for work of equal value would not, of course, fall evenly on all industries, or on all employers within a given industry. In fact, there is likely to be substantial variation in the magnitude of this impact, depending on such factors as the numbers of females employed, the degree of similarity (in terms of "value") between jobs currently performed by males and females, and the size of current pay differences between these jobs. In some cases the direct cost impact would be virtually nil, although, as we have seen, for some employers, *indirect* costs may still apply. To some extent, a rise in wage costs might stimulate measures to increase efficiency, or it could result in increase in selling prices, or reductions in profits. Where the cost impact differs substantially between firms competing in the same product market, it is possible that those employers incurring the highest cost increases might suffer some deterioration in their competitive position in relation to other employers in the industry. In terms of judging the implications of the "equal value" concept for the structure of industry, it would, therefore, be important to know the potential range of cost increase likely to be incurred by competing employers, rather than just the *average* increase. Unfortunately, statistical information on either point is unobtainable from published data sources, because measurement presumes some prior knowledge of the relative value of jobs.

EQUAL PAY AND  
THE ANTI-INFLATION  
PROGRAM

Before concluding the discussion of the cost impacts, something should be said of the relationship to the Anti-Inflation Program. In the U.K., the Equal Pay Act, though scheduled to take complete effect on December 29, 1975, contained provision for the Secretary of State for Employment to order partial implementation by December 31, 1973 if he was not satisfied with the extent of progress made by that date. In spite of some concern over the rate of progress, the government did not use these powers. One of the reasons for this undoubtedly was the incomes policy introduced in November 1972.<sup>21</sup> The government permitted the maximum increases under the incomes policy to be exceeded to allow women to receive one-third of any differential which existed between their pay and that of comparable male jobs on December 31, 1973. This was an incentive to equal pay, but a limited one, within the context of an incomes policy and a battle with inflation. Although the allowed reduction of pay differentials was on top of the general increases permitted, fears were expressed by men that the combined effect of wage restraint and implementation of equal pay would be to worsen the relative position of males who work in industries or groups which have a large proportion of females.

Similar fears could be encountered in Ontario, although the Federal government's Anti-Inflation Program permits the wage guidelines to be exceeded in the case of "payments by an employer to eliminate differences in benefits based on the sex, marital status or age of employees".<sup>22</sup> There have been no instances so far to illustrate how the Board will interpret this provision, or how far the Board will permit the guidelines to be exceeded in order to reduce disparities based on sex. It seems likely from

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<sup>21</sup> G.L. Buckingham, *What to do About Equal Pay for Women*, Gower Press, 1973, p. 96

<sup>22</sup> Anti-Inflation Act Regulations, Part 4, Division 4, Section B, item (M), p. 59

the discussion above that allowing above-guidelines-increases to reduce sex disparities could generate substantial pressure on other wage rates. There is no indication yet as to whether the Board will take such repercussions into consideration in deciding how far to go in permitting special treatment for equal pay increases.

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## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

RESTATEMENT OF  
PURPOSE OF THIS  
REPORT

Equal pay for work of equal value is a concept which recently has generated much discussion and controversy. However, the current public debate has been hampered by the lack of any thorough analysis of the concept of equal value or the implications of applying it to the labour market. In fact, in many cases it would appear that proponents and opponents of equal pay for work of equal value have different concepts in mind. The purpose of this report has been to provide a more thorough analysis of the concept of equal pay for work of equal value in order to improve the quality of the public debate. This report has not attempted to formulate specific public policy alternatives because in our view there is at present insufficient knowledge and empirical evidence on many important matters related to equal value to warrant doing so. The report has attempted to identify the principal deficiencies in the knowledge base which inhibit policy development.

*FEMALE/MALE  
PAY DIFFERENTIALS*

In the first chapter we examined the evidence on female/male earnings differentials and pointed out how little research has been done on the causes of these differentials. It was noted that statistics on pay differentials by occupation do not answer the specific question about the extent to which females are paid less than males for performing work of equal value. That question cannot be answered without having generally accepted criteria and procedures for measuring the value of different jobs. We noted that at present such criteria and procedures do not exist. However, insofar as interest in equal pay for work of equal value springs from a general concern about inequality of pay between the sexes, examination of earnings and pay differentials is highly relevant to a study of the concept of equal value.

One of the major assumptions underlying the recent interest in equal pay for work of equal value is that a substantial portion of the aggregate pay differential

between men and women is due to differences in the occupational distributions of men and women, as opposed to pay differentials within occupations. In Chapter 1 it was shown that no more than one-sixth of the over-all female/male differential in annual earnings (adjusted for hours worked) can be explained by differences between females and males in their distributions among broad occupational groups and classes. However, the principal effects of differences in occupational distribution are likely to occur at the level of narrowly defined occupations (or at even finer levels of disaggregation in terms of differences in the specific tasks performed by males and females). Unfortunately, there is a lack of *comprehensive* data on employment and pay rates by sex for narrowly defined occupations, and even more so for data on pay rates by sex classified according to detailed characteristics of job tasks. Our impression on the basis of limited observation is that differences in distribution of males and females among narrowly defined occupations probably explains a substantial proportion of over-all female/male pay differentials, but further research is needed on this question. If it were found that sex differences in distribution among narrowly defined occupations throughout the economy did in fact account for a large proportion of the over-all pay rate differential, then equal pay for work of equal value might contribute significantly to reducing that over-all differential--to the extent that jobs with different rates of pay could be shown to be of equal value.

THE PROBLEM OF  
IDENTIFYING EQUAL  
VALUE JOBS

The problem of identifying equal value jobs was the subject of Chapter 2. It was first pointed out that the substantial body of literature in Economics which constitutes the Theory of Value is not of much help in identifying equal value jobs. Economists have recognized increasingly that market determined values may not be

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ethically fair, socially desirable, or practically efficient. Yet, economists are generally unable to provide satisfactory alternative criteria for comparing the value of different jobs.

The greatest potential for identifying equal value jobs appears to lie in job evaluation. The bulk of the second chapter was devoted to summarizing the principal methods of job evaluation, and outlining the major limitations of relying on job evaluation for achieving equal pay for work of equal value. Among the limitations, it was pointed out that job evaluation is not an exact science and that its application can be influenced by many of the same factors which currently play a prominent role in wage determination in the absence of job evaluation. Job evaluation results are often rejected or altered if they result in changes which are unacceptable to a large number of workers or if the changes are too costly to the employer. There are difficulties in linking separate job evaluation schemes for different types of work. This is particularly important because of the common tendency to use different job evaluation plans for office than non-office groups. While job evaluation leads to the development of a basic wage and salary structure, it does not indicate what level of pay should be associated with a specific job or group of jobs.

*IMPORTANT  
IMPLICATIONS OF  
EQUAL VALUE*

The third chapter examined three important implications of equal pay for work of equal value - increased government intervention in the wage determination and collective bargaining processes; restraint on using the market for allocating labour among industries, employers, and regions; and impacts on pecuniary labour costs and inflation.

*INCREASED  
GOVERNMENT  
INTERVENTION  
IN WAGE DETER-  
MINATION*

It was pointed out that to ensure that equal pay for work of equal value was implemented in a fair way without various potential abuses occurring would probably require some increase in the degree of government intervention in collective bargaining and wage determination. The

exact degree of government intervention would depend upon how extensive the equal value requirement was formulated and how stringently it was applied. The need for government intervention would probably be greater in situations where no job evaluation presently exists than where there are systems currently in use. However, even where job evaluation systems exist, there may be a need for protection against abuses as well as intervention to reconcile inconsistencies between different systems.

*NEED TO COMPARE  
COSTS AND BENEFITS*

That it may require increased government intervention is certainly not a sufficient reason for rejecting equal pay for work of equal value. In Ontario there is a long history of government intervention in the workplace -- to safeguard the worker's physical well-being, to prevent economic exploitation, to achieve greater equity, and to improve the quality of work life. The deciding factor has always been whether the benefits to the worker or group of workers outweigh the costs (including undesirable side effects) of the intervention. In order to make that decision it is necessary to assess both the benefits and the costs. As noted earlier, at present there is not much empirical evidence available for measuring even approximately either the costs or the benefits of equal pay for work of equal value. However, this Report has attempted to at least identify the major benefits and costs of equal pay for work of equal value.

Chapter 1 described the nature of present female/male pay differentials which might be reduced to some (unknown) extent by equal pay for work of equal value. The bulk of Chapter 3 was used to identify potential costs. In digesting the sometimes complicated material in these two chapters, it is important to keep in mind a serious limitation of each of these chapters. Chapter 1, though giving statistics on female/male pay differentials, does not convey any of the strong feeling of discrimination and unfair treatment that is prevalent among so many women in the labour force, particularly in lower paid occupations. These feelings are difficult to

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come to grips with in a research study of this type, but they must be appreciated in considering equal pay for work of equal value. Chapter 3, though identifying and describing potential costs, could not establish either the certainty or the magnitude of such costs.

One of the serious potential costs of equal pay for work of equal value is the cost of restricting the flexibility of the wage mechanism as a device for allocating labour. Equal pay for work of equal value involves the application of criteria other than labour supply and demand for determining wages. In theory it may be argued that extensive use of non-market criteria for determining wages would impair the efficiency of the labour market and even make it necessary for increased direct government intervention in the labour allocation process, at least in the form of approving exceptions from the equal value principle where necessary to deal with labour recruitment and retention problems. Yet, as Chapter 3 noted, there are many economists who believe that the case for wage flexibility generally has been overstated and that movements of labour are 'preponderantly wage-insensitive'. Moreover, given the various imperfections which exist already in the labour market, it is not at all certain that the added weight of the equal value principle in wage determination would cause a substantial reduction in the efficiency of the labour market. Clearly a better understanding of the labour market implications of equal pay for work of equal value is required.

*IMPACT ON  
LABOUR COSTS*

The other potentially important cost of equal pay for work of equal value which was examined in Chapter 3 was the impact on the wage bill and wage related labour costs. First there is the direct cost impact. Wages and related benefits for women would have to be increased in situations where women are being paid less than men for work of equal value (assuming that it would be unacceptable to achieve equality by lowering men's wages). Until equal value jobs have been identified it is impossible to estimate the magnitude of these direct costs.

In addition to the direct costs, there may be various types of indirect costs, such as those arising from pressure to maintain pay relationships between women who did not qualify for increases as a result of equal value comparisons and those who did receive such increases. Chapter 3 described a variety of such potential indirect costs. The indirect costs are even less amenable to estimation than the direct costs, but many of them may not actually occur in practice. Moreover, the seriousness of both the direct and indirect costs would depend upon how long a time period were given for phasing in of the equal value requirement. Still the possibility of such costs is cause for concern in considering the competitiveness of the Ontario economy.

EQUAL VALUE  
IN OTHER  
JURISDICTIONS

The impact of equal pay for work of equal value on Ontario's competitive position immediately raises the question of what stance other jurisdictions are taking toward equal pay for work of equal value. Equal pay legislation and experience in other jurisdictions was discussed in Chapter 3. We observed that several countries now make specific reference to equal pay for work of equal value in their legislation. However, examination of the legislation itself and the way it has been applied indicate a widespread lack of distinction between equal pay for equal work (that is, the same or substantially similar work) and equal pay for work of equal value. In most cases the effect appears to be closer to 'equal work' as it occurs in Ontario's present legislation than to equal value as the concept has been used in this Report. Where equal value is concerned there is a great deal of reliance on voluntary adoption of job evaluation and requiring equal pay for jobs which are rated equally in a particular job evaluation scheme. In addition there is little indication as to whether the detailed provisions of job evaluation are taken at face value, or may be questioned. There seems to be widespread recognition that real progress toward equal pay for work of equal value has been quite slow. The principle reasons are:

WHERE I  
GO FROM

most of the legislation is quite recent; terms are not adequately defined in the legislation; the numerous possibilities for evasion of legislation have not been fully recognized; insufficient resources have been provided for enforcement; and perhaps most important, a great deal of time and effort is required to change public attitudes. However, the tentative nature of our conclusions on equal value in other jurisdictions must be emphasized. We have been dependent on our own reading of legislation and a limited number of second hand accounts of the experience with the legislation which have been published. Equal value presently is the subject of considerable attention in most jurisdictions, and it is important to continue monitoring developments in other jurisdictions.

WHERE DO WE  
GO FROM HERE?

To those who are looking for specific recommendations on equal pay for work of equal value, this Report may be a disappointment. We have explained earlier why no specific policy recommendations are presented. For those who wish to further the dialogue toward developing a policy on equal pay for work of equal value, and give a sharper focus to the public debate, it may be helpful to conclude by listing the major questions which we believe need to be answered in arriving at a policy toward equal pay for work of equal value:

- (1) What are the principal determinants of female/male pay differentials both within and between narrowly defined occupations?
- (2) To what extent does the introduction of various types of formal job evaluation systems reduce pay differentials between men and women?
- (3) How extensive is the use of various types of formal job evaluation systems presently in Ontario?
- (4) What are the principal barriers to the adoption of various job evaluation schemes?

- (5) Is it feasible to develop guidelines for defining what constitutes a legitimate use of job evaluation techniques, including the translation of job evaluation results into wage rates?
- (6) How can separate job evaluation schemes for different types of work, e.g. office, non-office, be integrated or linked?
- (7) How much wage flexibility is necessary in order to avoid serious labour recruitment and retention problems?
- (8) How could exceptions from the equal value principle be allowed for dealing with labour recruitment and retention problems without undermining public confidence in the just application of that principle?
- (9) How could the potentially large pecuniary cost impacts of equal pay for work of equal value be controlled without undermining the equal value objective?
- (10) How much progress toward equal pay for work of equal value is really being made in jurisdictions which include the term 'equal value' in their legislation?
- (11) To what extent can the problem of inequity in pay between males and females be solved by equal opportunity measures?
- (12) Would the adoption of various types of equal pay for work of equal value requirements make it necessary to have stronger equal opportunity measures?

This is a large agenda, and definitive answers to some of these questions are probably not possible. Yet, we doubt that a sound policy on equal pay for work of equal

value can be developed without more knowledge on most of these issues than exists presently. In our view the urgency of the problem of inequity in pay between females and males justifies that effort.

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

APPENDIX A.

RANK			MEDIAN EARNINGS,	MEDIAN EARNINGS,	RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
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APPENDIX A.  
MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
1	3111	Physicians and Surgeons	32,563	16,132**	49.5	2	7.6
2	1130	Genl. Managers & Other Senior Officials	24,683	16,519**	59.8	1	2.6
3	3113	Dentists	24,500	15,021	57.7	3	4.5
4	2341	Judges & Magistrates	24,091	*	*	*	*
5	2343	Lawyers & Notaries	20,881	9,571	46.7	7	4.2
6	1137	Sales & Advertising Management Occs.	19,632	5,231	26.5	105	2.8
7	1131	Management Occupations Nat. Scis. & Eng.	19,499	*	*	*	*
8	3153	Optometrists	18,349	*	*	*	*
9	1111	Members of Legislative Bodies	16,746	**	*	*	*
10	1133	Administrators in Teaching Related Fields	16,160	11,334	70.3	5	15.2
11	2711	University Teachers	16,002	11,959	71.1	4	12.1
12	1135	Financial Management Occupations	15,377	6,156	40.3	61	6.9
13	3117	Osteopaths & Chiropractors	15,204	*	*	*	*
14	3115	Veterinarians	15,126	*	*	*	*
15	1134	Administrators in Medicine & Health	15,034	8,730	58.0	14	50.4
16	1136	Personnel & Industrial Relations Mgt. Occs.	15,000	7,267	48.4	34	9.9
17	1145	Mgt. Occs. Construction Operations	14,155	*	*	*	*
18	1149	Other Managers	14,040	5,574	39.7	87	52.4
19	1113	Government Administrators	13,905	8,000	57.5	22	9.9
20	2141	Architects	13,675	*	*	*	*
21	9111	Air Pilots, Navigators, & Flight Eng.	13,611	*	*	*	*
22	2113	Physicists	13,346	*	*	*	*
23	1147	Mgt. Occs. Trans. & Commun. Operations	13,319	6,222	46.7	59	7.7
24	2112	Geologists	13,068	*	*	*	*
25	2311	Economists	12,905	8,591	66.5	16	9.7

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
26	2143	Civil Engineers	12,853	9,143	71.1	11	1.2
27	2151	Metallurgical Engineers	12,628	*	*	*	*
28	2793	Post-Secondary School Teachers N.E.C.	12,492	8,698	69.6	15	53.0
29	3151	Pharmacists	12,404	8,805	70.9	13	16.4
30	2153	Mining Engineers	12,388	*	*	*	*
31	2144	Electrical Engineers	12,153	7,000	57.6	39-40	1.0
32	1143	Production Management Occupations	12,386	5,846**	47.2	72	2.0
33	2391	Education & Vocational Counsellors	12,378	10,263	84.0	6	32.2
34	1142	Services Management Occupations	12,178	*	*	*	*
35	3330	Producers & Directors Perform. & Aud-Vis.	12,121	9,032	74.5	12	14.6
36	1119	Offic. & Admin. Unique to Govt. N.E.C.	12,027	*	*	*	*
37	9153	Engineering Officers, Ship	11,972	*	*	*	*
38	2133	Biologists & Rel. Scientists	11,962	7,800	65.2	26	24.2
39	2159	Architects & Engineers N.E.C.	11,892	*	*	*	*
40	2142	Chemical Engineers	11,890	*	*	*	*
41	6116	Commissioned Officers Armed Forces	11,802	9,323	79.0	10	1.2
42	2147	Mechanical Engineers	11,755	*	*	*	*
43	2791	Com. Coll. & Voc. School Teachers	11,747	8,579	73.0	17	23.8
44	8730	Foremen: Elect. Powerlight & Wire	11,666	7,000	60.0	39-40	1.2
45	1179	Occs. Related to Mgt. & Admin. N.E.C.	11,655	7,348	63.0	32	55.6
46	1132	Mgt. Occs., Social Sc. & Rel. Fields	11,632	9,417	80.9	8	29.0
47	9550	Foremen: Elect. & Rel. Comm. Equip.	11,455	*	*	*	*
48	2181	Mathematicians Stats. & Actuaries	11,449	6,750	58.9	41	17.8
49	2733	Secondary School Teachers	11,250	9,405	83.6	9	35.3
50	2155	Aeronautical Engineers	11,245	*	*	*	*

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

APPENDIX A:

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
51	8510	Foremen: Fab. & Ass. Occs.-Metal Prod. NEC	11,174	5,000	44.7	116	1.5
52	1174	Personnel & Related Officers	11,162	7,525	67.4	30	10.1
53	7710	Foremen: Mining Quar. Incl. Oil Gas Occs.	11,159	*	*	*	*
54	5170	Sup.: Sales Occupations Service	10,948	6,364	58.1	53	8.0
55	8110	Foremen: Mineral Ore Treating Occs.	10,938	*	*	*	*
56	9151	Deck Officers	10,889	*	*	*	*
57	9110	Foremen: Air Trans. Operating Occs.	10,714	*	*	*	*
58	9531	Power Station Operators	10,656	*	*	*	*
59	4140	Sup. Off. Mach. El. Data Pro. Equip. Op.	10,605	5,930	55.9	70	31.1
60	8250	Foremen: Pulp & Papermaking & Rel. Occs.	10,605	*	*	*	*
61	2160	Sup.: Other Occs. in Arch. & Eng.	10,559	*	*	*	*
62	8130	Foremen: Metal Processing & Rel. Occs.	10,538	*	*	*	*
63	2145	Industrial Engineers	10,496	5,556	52.9	88	2.8
64	5131	Technical Salesmen & Related Advisors	10,475	6,500	62.0	44-45	2.1
65	2119	Occ. in Phys. Sciences N.E.C.	10,446	5,250	50.2	103	7.9
66	2183	Draughtsmen	10,409	7,872	75.6	24	13.2
67	9530	Foremen: Stat. Eng. & Util. Equip.	10,387	*	*	*	*
68	2131	Agriculturalists & Related Scientists	10,385	8,571	82.5	18	3.3
69	3352	Writers & Editors	10,348	7,287	70.4	33	24.8
70	1171	Accts., Auditors & Other Financial Officers	10,287	6,099	59.2	63	14.2
71	9515	Photoengravers & Related Occs.	10,250	4,923	48.0	118	7.7
72	6112	Policemen & Detectives, Government	10,202	7,558	74.0	29	2.0
73	2111	Chemists	10,157	8,358	82.2	19	9.5
74	8160	Foremen: Chemicals, Pet., & Rel. Ind.	10,139	4,829	47.6	126	4.2
75	8310	Foremen: Metal Machining Occupations	10,086	*	*	*	*

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
76	8780	Foremen: Other Const. Trades Occs.	10,073	7,973	79.1	23	0.6
77	8330	Foremen: Met.Shap.Form Occs.Except Mach.	9,913	5,706	57.5	81	1.6
78	8736	Insp., Test., Grad., & Samp. Occs.	9,853	5,491	55.7	99	10.9
79	9510	Foremen: Printing & Rel. Occs.	9,826	5,352	54.4	99	6.5
80	8731	Elect. Power Linemen & Related Occs.	9,817	*	*	*	*
81	2139	Occs. in Life Sciences, N.E.C.	9,806	4,882	49.7	121	19.6
82	2797	Instruct. & Training Off. N.E.C.	9,669	7,404	76.5	31	24.6
83	8530	Foremen: Fab. Assem. Install., Repair N.E.C.	9,640	4,718	48.9	139	6.0
84	9133	Conductors & Brakemen Railway	9,629	*	*	*	*
85	2739	Elem. & Sec. School Teach. & Rel. Occs.NEC	9,609	7,183	74.7	35	57.0
86	6111	Fire-fighting occupations	9,597	*	*	*	*
87	9190	Foremen: Other Transportation Rel. Equip.	9,483	*	*	*	*
88	9910	Supervisors & Foremen, N.E.C.	9,465	4,714	49.8	141	4.2
89	1175	Pur. Off. & Buyers Except Wh. & Ret. Trade	9,462	6,471	68.3	47	10.1
90	5173	Salesmen & Traders, Securities	9,437	6,129	64.9	62	7.1
91	1141	Purchasing Management Occupations	9,423	5,822	61.7	75	9.8
92	2165	Architecture & Engineers Technol. & Tech.	9,371	5,824	62.1	74	1.9
93	5174	Advertising Salesmen	9,335	5,739	61.4	78	11.7
94	9131	Locomotive Engineers & Firemen	9,324	*	*	*	*
95	8570	Foremen: Fab. Assem. & Repair Occ.	9,303	5,227	56.1	106	4.5
96	5133	Commerical Travellers	9,253	5,957	64.3	69	1.7
97	8150	Foremen: Clay, Glass Stone Processing	9,239	*	*	*	*
98	4190	Sup.: Other Clerical & Rel. Occs. N.E.C.	9,230	6,325	68.5	54	36.4
99	9557	Motion Picture Projectionists	9,207	*	*	*	*
100	5191	Buyers, Wholesale & Retail Trade	9,203	6,079	66.0	65	24.8

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

APPENDIX A:

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
101	2331	Social Workers	9,159	8,144	88.9	21	55.7
102	8733	Construction Electricians & Repairmen	9,145	5,143	56.2	108	0.8
103	8590	Foremen: Prod. Fab. Ass. & Repair	9,130	5,086	55.7	110	6.0
104	1116	Inspectors & Regulatory Officers Govt.	9,118	7,782	85.3	27	5.0
105	8210	Foremen: Food, Bev. & Rel. Processing Occs.	9,115	5,725	62.8	79	6.2
106	9514	Printing Engravers Except Photoengravers	9,095	4,767	52.4	134	6.7
107	5177	Business Services Salesmen	9,055	6,378	70.4	51	11.3
108	4130	Sup.: Book., Acct.-Recording & Rel. Occs.	9,055	5,667	62.5	83	49.0
109	8739	Elect. Power Light & Wire Comm.	9,054	*	*	*	*
110	1176	Insp. & Regulatory Officers, Non-Govt.	9,049	4,828	53.3	127	7.3
111	8580	Foremen: Mech. & Repair Except Electrical	9,005	6,667	74.0	43	0.8
112	8165	Distilling Sublim. & Carbon Occs.	9,000	*	*	*	*
113	4170	Sup.: Reception, Info., Mail, Messenger Occs.	8,956	5,777	64.5	77	34.6
114	2792	Fine Arts School Teachers	8,944	7,023	78.5	37	43.8
115	8370	Foremen: Clayglass & Stone & Rel.	8,936	*	*	*	*
116	9130	Foremen: Railway Trans. Operating Occs.	8,932	*	*	*	*
117	8311	Tool & Die Making Occupations	8,890	5,038	56.6	114	1.3
118	2351	Librarians & Archivists	8,867	7,829	88.2	25	78.4
119	8791	Pipefitting Plumbing & Rel. Occs.	8,863	6,375	71.9	52	0.4
120	9191	Subway & Street Railway Co. Occs.	8,859	*	*	*	*
121	8793	Structural Metal Erectors	8,799	*	*	*	*
122	8535	Electrical & Rel. Equip. Installers	8,789	4,824	54.8	128	4.1
123	7713	Other Rock & Soil Drilling Occs.	8,786	*	*	*	*
124	5171	Insurance Salesmen & Agents	8,752	5,084	58.0	111	14.4
125	5130	Sup.: Sales Occupations Commodities	8,744	4,231	48.3	197	14.0

APPENDIX A:  
MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
126	8135	Metal Rolling Occupations	8,741	*	*	*	*
127	8786	Insulating Occupations Construction	8,722	*	*	*	*
128	8710	Foremen: Excav., Grading, Paving & Rel. Occs	8,720	*	*	*	*
129	5179	Sales Occupations: Services N.E.C.	8,719	5,067	58.1	113	12.3
130	8796	Insp., Test., Grad., & Samp. Occs.	8,715	*	*	*	*
131	8735	Wire Comm. & Rel. Equip. Installers	8,685	*	*	*	*
132	8395	Pattern Makers & Mould Makers, N.E.C.	8,685	*	*	*	*
133	8584	Indep. Farm & Const. Mach. Mech. & Rep.	8,679	5,889	67.8	71	6.8
134	9311	Hoisting Occupations N.E.C.	8,657	*	*	*	*
135	8588	Precision Instru. Mech. & Repairmen	8,644	*	*	*	*
136	7719	Mining, Quar. Inc. Oil & Gas Occs., N.E.C.	8,616	6,500	75.4	44-45	4.4
137	9170	Foremen: Motor Transport. Operating Occs.	8,573	3,941	45.9	224	1.6
138	2163	Draughtsmen	8,562	6,264	73.1	55	5.9
139	2349	Occs. in Law & Jurisprudence, N.E.C.	8,500	6,241	73.4	57	27.4
140	4150	Sup.: Mat., Rec., Sched. & Distrib. Occs.	8,474	5,266	62.1	102	6.8
141	3313	Product & Interior Designers	8,473	4,624	54.5	147	31.3
142	9539	Stat. Eng. & Unit Equip. Operators	8,453	6,235	73.7	58	0.7
143	2117	Phys. Sc. Technol. & Technicians	8,448	5,631	66.6	85	12.7
144	7510	Foremen: Forestry & Logging Occupations	8,393	*	*	*	*
145	8550	Foremen: Fab. Assem. & Repair Occs.	8,376	4,735	56.5	137	24.4
146	5190	Sup.: Other Sales Occupations	8,365	5,529	66.1	90-91	11.9
147	9310	Foremen: Mat. Hand. & Rel. Occs. N.E.C.	8,363	4,775	57.1	133	4.8
148	8526	Insp. Test. Grad. & Samp. Occs.	8,361	4,410	52.7	168	10.3
149	2799	Other Teaching & Related Occs. N.E.C.	8,360	7,745	92.6	28	33.2
150	9113	Air Transp. Operating Support Occs.	8,351	*	*	*	*

## APPENDIX A:

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
151	1115	Postmasters	8,305	4,250	51.1	195	42.4
152	7519	Forestry & Logging Occupations N.E.C.	8,296	*	*	*	*
153	6141	Funeral Directors, Embalms. & Rel. Occs.	8,295	*	*	*	*
154	9193	Motormen & Dinkeymen except Rail Transport	8,290	*	*	*	*
155	8253	Papermaking & Finishing Occupations	8,247	*	*	*	*
156	8260	Foremen: Textile Processing Occupations	8,233	4,727	57.4	138	9.6
157	9511	Typesetters & Compositors	8,225	4,904	59.6	120	9.7
158	8131	Metal Smelt, Conv., Refin. Furnacemen	8,185	*	*	*	*
159	8337	Boilermakers Plate. & Struc. Metal Work	8,177	*	*	*	*
160	8533	Elect. & Rel. Equip., Installers	8,171	4,425	54.1	165	3.4
161	6113	Policemen & Investigators, Private	8,162	4,500	55.1	155	11.0
162	8179	Chemical Pet. Rubber, Plastic & Rel. N.E.C.	8,154	4,091	50.1	210	17.4
163	8227	Beverage Processing Occupations	8,152	4,857	59.8	123	7.0
164	7717	Mining, Quar.: Cut., Hand., & Load. Occs.	8,139	*	*	*	*
165	3314	Advertising & Illustrating Artists	8,135	5,709	70.1	80	17.0
166	9512	Printing Press Occupations	8,116	4,294	52.9	188	6.3
167	3154	Dispensing Opticians	8,107	6,000	74.0	67	19.2
168	8738	Occs.: Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.	8,098	*	*	*	*
169	4193	Travel Clerks Ticket Stn. Freight Agent	8,070	6,493	80.4	46	41.6
170	8333	Sheet Metal Workers	8,053	4,371	54.2	173	2.7
171	8350	Foremen: Wood Machine Occupations	8,038	*	*	*	*
172	8582	Aircraft Mechanics & Repairmen	8,018	*	*	*	*
173	2333	Occs. in Welfare & Community Services	8,004	6,416	80.1	49	45.4
174	3337	Radio & Television Announcers	7,985	*	*	*	*
175	9171	Bus Drivers	7,977	2,449	30.7	288	5.2

APPENDIX A:  
 MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
 FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
176	9916	Insp., Test., Grad., & Sampling Occs. N.E.C.	7,954	4,350	54.6	180	15.6
177	8251	Cellulose Pulp Preparing Occupations	7,949	*	*	*	*
178	3332	Musicians	7,944	4,364	54.9	176	16.9
179	8316	Insp., Test., Grad., & Samp. Occs. - Mach.	7,933	4,469	56.3	158	20.8
180	9551	Radio & TV Broad. Equip. Operators	7,930	*	*	*	*
181	8259	Pulp & Papermaking & Rel. Occs. N.E.C.	7,927	5,529	69.7	90	5.8
182	8313	Machinist & Mach. Tool Setting-up Occs.	7,719	4,284	55.5	190	4.2
183	8586	Insp., Test., Grad. & Samp. Occs. - Prod.	7,911	*	*	*	*
184	2731	Elementary & Kindergarten Teachers	7,910	7,012	88.6	38	77.4
185	8113	Mix. Sep. Filt. & Rel. Min. Ores Occs.	7,983	*	*	*	*
186	9518	Occs.: Lab. & Other Elem. Work	7,882	3,912	49.6	227	16.0
187	3315	Photographers & Cameramen	7,878	5,842	74.1	73	5.9
188	4111	Secretaries & Stenographers	7,862	5,191	66.0	107	97.9
189	7715	Blasting Occupations	7,860	*	*	*	*
190	8256	Insp., Test., Grad., & Samp. Occs. - Pulp	7,856	5,429	69.1	97	13.4
191	8540	Foremen: Fab. Ass. & Repair Occs.	7,854	*	*	*	*
192	8784	Plasterers & Related Occupations	7,854	*	*	*	*
193	2315	Psychologists	7,846	6,680	85.1	42	49.1
194	4151	Production Clerks	7,840	4,837	61.7	124	16.5
195	3370	Coach. Train. Inst. & Mgrs., Sport & Rec.	7,814	5,656	72.3	84	20.0
196	3339	Occs. Perform & Audio-Vis. Arts N.E.C.	7,800	5,538	71.0	89	11.8
197	8176	Insp., Test., Grad., & Samp. Occs.-Chemicals	7,794	4,463	57.2	161	33.9
198	9553	Telegraph Operators	7,791	5,700	73.1	82	15.1
199	5172	Real Estate Salesmen	7,783	5,142	66.0	109	18.0
200	3130	Supervisors: Nursing Occupations	7,776	8,278	106.4	20	92.5

## APPENDIX A:

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
201	9179	Motor Transport Operating Occs. N.E.C.	7,766	3,791	48.8	241	11.0
202	8585	Bus. & Comm. Mech. & Repairmen	7,746	5,583	72.0	86	1.8
203	8589	Mech. & Repairmen Except Electrical N.E.C.	7,733	4,412	57.0	167	1.0
204	8146	Insp., Test., Grad., Samp. Occ.-Met. Pro.	7,732	4,621	59.7	148	14.4
205	3155	Radiological Technol. & Technicians	7,730	5,811	75.1	76	70.5
206	9135	Rail Transport Operating Support Occs.	7,723	*	*	*	*
207	8783	Concrete Finishing & Rel. Occs.	7,714	*	*	*	*
208	6190	Sup.: Other Service Occupations	7,708	4,369	56.6	174	10.6
209	8336	Insp., Test., Grad., & Samp. Occs.-Metal	7,704	5,450	70.4	96	13.7
210	4192	Adjusters, Claim	7,693	4,808	62.5	129	54.6
211	8527	Precision Instruments & Rel. Equip.	7,683	4,430	57.6	164	50.9
212	8133	Metal Heat Treating Occupations	7,667	*	*	*	*
213	2161	Surveyors	7,664	*	*	*	*
214	8576	Insp. Test. Grad & Samp. Occs.	7,663	4,149	54.1	202	36.5
215	8513	Motor Veh. Fab. & Ass. Occs. N.E.C.	7,660	4,464	58.2	160	12.2
216	8331	Forging Occupations	7,637	*	*	*	*
217	8111	Crushing & Grinding Occs., Mineral Ores	7,632	*	*	*	*
218	8511	Eng. & Rel. Equip. Fab. Ass. Occs. N.E.C.	7,613	4,283	56.2	192	16.7
219	4195	Personnel Clerks	7,606	6,251	82.1	56	71.1
220	8571	Bond. & Cement Occs., Rub., Plas., Related	7,594	4,136	54.4	204	7.5
221	8515	Eng. & Rel. Equip. Fab. Ass. Occs. N.E.C.	7,586	5,250	69.2	104	5.8
222	8335	Welding & Flame Cutting Occupations	7,584	4,323	57.0	185	6.1
223	8795	Glaziers	7,575	*	*	*	*
224	4157	Weighers	7,563	4,595	60.7	151	13.3
225	9159	Water Trans. Operating Occs. N.E.C.	7,546	*	*	*	*

APPENDIX A:  
MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
226	8583	Rail Transport Equip. Mech. & Repair	7,545	*	*	*	*
227	8167	Roast Cook. & Drying Occs., Chem.	7,533	*	*	*	*
228	2135	Life Science Technol. & Technicians	7,533	6,077	80.6	66	35.8
229	5135	Salesmen - Salespersons Comm. N.E.C.	7,519	3,804	50.0	238	10.5
230	8575	Cut. & Fin. Occs., Rub. Plas. & Rel.	7,517	4,171	55.4	201	25.6
231	7718	Occs.: Lab. & Other Elem. Wk. Min.	7,513	*	*	*	*
232	3157	Dental Hygienists Assist. & Technicians	7,509	4,361	58.0	177	73.8
233	9517	Bookbinders & Related Occupations	7,506	4,417	58.8	166	67.7
234	3137	Physio. Occs., & Other Therapists	7,500	7,163	95.5	36	81.1
235	8148	Occs. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk. - Met. Pro.	7,471	3,667	49.0	253	4.3
236	8711	Excavating Grading & Related Occs.	7,470	*	*	*	*
237	4139	Book., Acc.-Rec. & Rel. Occs. N.E.C.	7,442	4,797	64.4	132	65.5
238	3156	Medical Lab. Technol. & Technicians	7,442	6,084	81.7	64	71.0
239	4173	Mail & Postal Clerks	7,435	4,808	64.6	130	27.6
240	8149	Metal Proc. & Related Occupations N.E.C.	7,414	4,284	57.7	191	5.7
241	8781	Carpenters & Related Occupations	7,368	4,500	61.0	157	0.3
242	4172	Mail Carriers	7,341	3,967	54.0	220	3.7
243	4137	Statistical Clerks	7,334	5,311	72.4	100	63.8
244	8536	Insp., Test., Grad., & Samp. Occs. - Fab.	7,332	4,466	60.9	159	43.7
245	4143	Elect. Data-pro. Equipment Operators	7,310	4,948	67.6	117	72.8
246	8258	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Work, Pulp	7,280	4,667	64.1	144	3.3
247	5193	Driver-Salesmen	7,266	4,308	59.2	187	1.6
248	8399	Other Machining & Rel. Occs. N.E.C.	7,264	*	*	*	*
249	7517	Log. Hoist. Sort. Moving & Rel. Occs.	7,259	*	*	*	*
250	8315	Machine Tool Operating Occupations	7,253	4,105	56.6	207	6.3

## APPENDIX A:

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
251	8151	Furnacemen & Kiln.: Clay Glass Stone	7,243	*	*	*	*
252	8799	Other Construction Trades Occ. N.E.C.	7,242	4,636	64.0	146	2.0
253	8161	Mixing & Blend Occs.-Chem. & Rel. Mat.	7,240	4,075	56.2	212	5.8
254	8226	Insp., Test., Grad., & Samp. Occ.-Food & Bev.	7,238	4,682	64.6	143	36.5
255	9591	Photographic Processing Occupations	7,234	4,377	60.5	172	37.3
256	8719	Excav. Grad. Pav. & Rel. Occs. N.E.C.	7,233	*	*	*	*
257	8393	Filing, Grinding, Buffing, Cleaning	7,231	4,326	59.8	184	5.1
258	8137	Mould Core & Metal Casting Occs.	7,230	3,805	52.6	237	5.0
259	9157	Engine & Boiler Room Crew Ship	7,218	*	*	*	*
260	6117	Other Ranks Armed Forces	7,218	4,916	68.1	119	2.2
261	8523	Ind. Farm Const. & Other Mechanics	7,213	4,367	60.5	175	4.8
262	8118	Occs., Lab., & Other Elem. Wrk. - Min.	7,198	*	*	*	*
263	8581	Motor Vehicle Mechanics & Repairmen	7,177	5,488	76.4	95	0.7
264	4191	Collectors	7,170	4,837	67.4	125	51.9
265	4199	Other Clerical & Related Occs. N.E.C.	7,161	5,017	70.0	115	55.8
266	8293	Tobacco Processing Occupations	7,156	6,194	86.5	60	40.2
267	8159	Clay, Glass Stone Pro. Form. Rel. N.E.C.	7,141	4,508	63.1	153	10.9
268	8230	Wood Proc. Occs. Except Pulp&Papermaking	7,118	*	*	*	*
269	8579	Fab. Ass. & Repair Occs. - Rub.	7,114	4,052	56.9	215	28.1
270	8379	Clay Glass & Stone & Rel. Mat.	7,111	3,706	52.1	252	16.5
271	8339	Met. Shap. & Form. Occs. Except Mach. N.E.C.	7,076	4,461	63.0	162	17.9
272	8178	Occs., Lab. & Other Elem. Wrk.	7,075	3,979	56.2	218	14.2
273	9175	Truck Drivers	7,075	5,074	71.7	112	0.8
274	9315	Mat. Handling Equip. Ops. N.E.C.	7,061	5,500	77.8	92-93	0.8
275	8529	Other Fab. & Ass. Occs.-Met. Prod. N.E.C.	7,053	4,012	56.8	216	21.8

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
276	8578	Occs. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.: Fab.	7,041	4,000	56.8	217	32.3
277	6119	Protective Service Occupations, N.E.C.	7,034	5,500	78.1	92-93	7.0
278	3375	Attendants Sports & Recreation	7,033	*	*	*	*
279	8173	Coat. & Calen. Occs. - Chemicals & Rel.	7,030	3,710	52.7	251	28.7
280	8215	Slaughter. & Meat Out. Canning Curing & Pack.	7,018	4,858	69.2	122	15.8
281	8587	Watch & Clock Repairmen	7,016	*	*	*	*
282	8595	Paint. & Dec. Occs. Except Construction	7,006	3,790	54.1	242	10.1
283	8229	Food & Beverage Processors N.E.C.	7,004	4,096	58.4	209	26.2
284	6131	Mgrs.: Hotel Motel & Other Accommodations	7,003	3,525	50.3	268	46.8
285	8141	Metal Extruding & Drawing Occupations	7,000	4,207	60.1	198	12.9
286	8593	Paper Prod Fab. & Assem. Occs.	6,986	4,107	58.7	206	29.6
287	7180	Foremen: Other Farm Hort. An. Hus. Occs.	6,965	4,500	64.6	156	5.2
288	6160	Sup.: Apparel & Furnish. Serv. Occs.	6,958	3,892	55.9	230	23.1
289	9919	Other Occupations N.E.C.	6,954	4,396	63.2	170	13.2
290	4131	Bookkeepers & Accounting Clerks	6,934	4,802	69.2	131	69.3
291	8596	Insp., Test., Grad., & Samp. Occs. Other Prod	6,925	4,323	62.4	186	53.6
292	9519	Printing & Related Occupations N.E.C.	6,914	4,258	61.5	194	36.4
293	5149	Sales Occupations: Commodities N.E.C.	6,905	4,192	60.7	200	53.3
294	8143	Plating Met. Spray. & Rel. Occs.	6,875	3,741	54.4	248	9.5
295	8539	Fab. Ass. Install. & Repair Occ.	6,854	4,071	59.4	213	30.6
296	8371	Cutting & Shap. Occ.: Clay Glass	6,851	*	*	*	*
297	7513	Timber Cutting & Related Occupations	6,840	*	*	*	*
298	4197	General Office Clerks	6,836	4,758	69.6	135	67.2
299	8531	Elect. Equip. Fab. & Ass. Occs.	6,828	4,461	65.3	163	48.3
300	7511	Forestry Conservation Occupations	6,775	*	*	*	*

## APPENDIX A:

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
301	8785	Painters Paperhangers & Rel. Occs.	6,763	4,407	65.1	169	2.1
302	9199	Other Trans. & Rel. Equip. Operators	6,762	*	*	*	*
303	8713	Paving Surfacing & Related Occs.	6,761	*	*	*	*
304	8319	Metal Machining Occupations N.E.C.	6,742	*	*	*	*
305	8798	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Work	6,735	5,400	80.1	98	1.0
306	8334	Metal Working-Machine Operators N.E.C.	6,726	4,204	62.5	199	16.3
307	8153	Sep. Grinding, Crushing, & Mixing Occs.	6,726	*	*	*	*
308	8599	Other Prod. Fab. Ass. & Rep. Occs. N.E.C.	6,723	3,587	53.3	260	31.8
309	8537	Radio & Television Service Repairmen	6,719	4,395	65.4	171	3.2
310	9155	Deck Crew Ship	6,713	*	*	*	*
311	4141	Office Machine Operators	6,709	4,665	69.5	145	79.0
312	2169	Other Occs. in Arch. & Eng. N.E.C.	6,692	*	*	*	*
313	8573	Mould. Occs.-Rub. Plas. & Rel. Prod.	6,690	3,639	54.3	256	35.3
314	8156	Insp., Test., Grad., Samp. Occs.-Clay	6,680	5,278	79.0	101	38.1
315	5137	Sales Clerks Commodities	6,670	3,475	52.1	273	53.8
316	9313	Longshoremen Stevedores & Freight Han.	6,658	*	*	*	*
317	8591	Jewel & Silver Fab. Ass. & Repair	6,656	3,408	51.2	279	33.2
318	8223	Milk Processing Occupations	6,656	4,278	64.2	193	6.3
319	6120	Sup.: Food Bev. Prep., Rel. Serv. Occs.	6,651	4,346	65.3	182	35.6
320	8787	Roofing Water Proofing & Rel. Occs.	6,643	*	*	*	*
321	9319	Mat. Hand. & Related Occs. N.E.C.	6,636	4,710	70.9	142	14.0
322	4133	Tellers & Cashiers	6,636	4,108	61.9	205	89.9
323	4155	Stock Clerks & Related Occupations	6,629	4,338	65.4	183	22.0
324	4179	Rec. Info. Mailmess. Distrib. Occs. N.E.C.	6,618	4,621	69.8	149	48.6
325	4112	Typists & Clerk Typists	6,612	4,502	68.3	154	95.0

APPENDIX A:  
MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
326	8534	Elect. Equip. Fab. & Ass. Occs.	6,602	4,352	65.9	179	72.8
327	8155	Form. Occupations: Clay Glass & Stone	6,596	4,350	65.9	181	8.2
328	4159	Mat. Rec. Sched. & Dist. Occs. N.E.C.	6,575	3,946	60.0	223	38.2
329	9318	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Mat. Han.	6,558	3,831	58.4	234	4.8
330	3131	Nurses Graduate Except Supervisors	6,509	6,461	99.2	48	97.5
331	8528	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Fab.	6,450	3,627	56.2	257	17.0
332	8213	Baking, Confect. Making & Related Occs.	6,445	3,932	61.0	226	28.3
333	8171	Crush & Grind Occs.-Chemicals & Rel.	6,440	3,519	54.6	269	13.5
334	4153	Shipping & Receiving Clerks	6,437	4,146	64.4	203	10.3
335	8562	Upholsterers	6,414	4,244	66.1	196	13.4
336	8718	Occs. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.	6,398	*	*	*	*
337	8279	Textile Processing Occupations N.E.C.	6,395	3,822	59.7	235	38.4
338	9918	Labourers N.E.C.	6,373	3,811	59.8	236	16.7
339	9317	Packaging Occupations: N.E.C.	6,347	3,977	62.6	219	64.9
340	4135	Insurance Bank & Other Finance Clerks	6,344	4,599	72.4	150	80.8
341	8211	Flour & Grain Milling Occupations	6,343	*	*	*	*
342	6115	Guards & Watchmen	6,303	5,966	94.6	68	4.3
343	8551	Pattern. Mark. & Cut. Occs.-Tex.	6,298	3,580	56.8	263	32.3
344	8598	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Const.	6,289	3,746	59.5	246	24.7
345	8221	Fruit & Veg. Can. Preserv., Pkg. Occs.	6,282	4,085	65.0	211	46.8
346	8158	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Clay	6,241	3,905	62.5	228	10.1
347	8267	Hide & Pelt Processing Occupations	6,224	4,293	68.9	189	17.5
348	4171	Receptionists & Information Clerks	6,206	4,360	70.2	178	94.4
349	4161	Library & File Clerks	6,166	4,756	77.1	136	82.4
350	8267	Textile Weaving Occupations	6,150	3,896	63.3	229	38.6

## APPENDIX A:

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
351	5141	Street Vendors & Door-to-door Salesmen	6,145	2,737	44.5	285	12.4
352	8373	Abrad. & Polish. Occs.-Clay, Glass	6,143	3,878	63.1	232	15.8
353	8592	Marine Craft Fab. Ass. & Repair. Occs.	6,109	*	*	*	*
354	8228	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Food	6,102	4,101	67.2	208	29.0
355	8538	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Fab.	6,083	3,953	64.9	221	48.6
356	8563	Sew. Mach. Ops., Tex. & Similar Materials	6,075	3,592	59.1	249	88.0
357	8715	Railway Sectionmen & Trackmen	6,065	*	*	*	*
358	2719	Univers. Teaching & Rel. Occs. N.E.C.	6,056	6,391	105.5	50	26.0
359	3134	Nursing Assistants	6,021	4,717	78.3	140	90.2
360	8236	Insp. Text. Grad. & Samp. Occs.-Wood Prod.	6,010	4,567	75.9	152	12.2
361	8541	Cabinet & Wood Furniture Makers	6,002	3,779	62.9	243	8.8
362	8263	Textile Spinning & Twisting Occs.	5,979	3,658	61.1	255	61.5
363	7199	Other Farm., Hort., Animal Hus. Occs. NEC	5,958	3,404	57.1	280	27.9
364	6191	Janitors, Charworkers & Cleaners	5,944	3,420	57.5	277	19.8
365	7195	Nursery & Related Workers	5,925	3,338	56.3	281	3.1
366	6130	Sup.: Occs. Lodging & Other Accommod.	5,889	3,739	63.4	249	65.7
367	6165	Pressing Occupations	5,855	3,486	59.5	272	72.6
368	7197	Farm Mach. Op. & Custom Operators	5,826	*	*	*	*
369	8549	Fab. Ass. & Repair Occs.-Wood	5,704	3,793	66.5	240	13.7
370	8553	Tailors & Dressmakers	5,656	3,465	61.2	274	50.1
371	3135	Nursing Aides & Orderlies	5,655	4,058	71.7	214	67.3
372	3311	Painters, Sculptors & Related Artists	5,641	3,571	63.3	266	17.0
373	8355	Plan. Turn. Shap. & Rel. Wood	5,566	3,743	67.1	247	14.1
374	8569	Fab. Ass., & Repairing Occs.: Textiles	5,538	3,499	63.2	270	69.8
375	2511	Ministers of Religion	5,444	2,511	46.1	287	2.8

## APPENDIX A:

MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	% RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
376	8275	Tex. Finishing & Calendering Occs.	5,420	3,435	63.3	276	35.1
377	6121	Chefs & Cooks	5,377	3,572	66.4	265	42.0
378	8231	Sawmill Sawyers & Related Occupations	5,364	*	*	*	*
379	9173	Taxi Drivers & Chauffeurs	5,362	3,886	72.4	231	2.9
380	8261	Textile Fibre Preparing Occupations	5,342	3,583	67.0	261	28.6
381	6123	Bartenders	5,289	3,939	74.4	225	7.8
382	8357	Wood Sanding Occupations	5,248	3,797	72.3	239	30.4
383	8353	Wood Saw. & Rel. Occs. Except Sawmill	5,239	3,333	63.6	282	5.3
384	6162	Laundering & Dry Cleaning Occupations	5,233	3,459	66.1	275	66.1
385	8278	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Tex.	5,229	3,607	68.9	258	37.4
386	8273	Textile Bleaching & Dyeing Occs.	5,219	*	*	*	*
387	6193	Elevator Operating Occupations	5,182	3,774	72.8	244	21.3
388	7518	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Logging	5,131	*	*	*	*
389	8548	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Fabricating	5,056	3,763	74.4	245	12.4
390	8238	Occ. Lab. & Other Elem. Wk.-Wood	5,024	3,952	78.6	222	7.3
391	6199	Other Service Occupations N.E.C.	5,000	3,581	71.6	262	7.5
392	4177	Messengers	4,984	3,845	77.1	233	18.1
393	8561	Shoemaking & Repairing Occupations	4,957	3,566	71.9	267	56.1
394	6129	Food & Bev. Prep. & Rel. Occs. N.E.C.	4,923	3,737	75.9	250	89.7
395	6149	Personal Service Occupations N.E.C.	4,849	2,535	52.2	286	92.8
396	5145	Service Station Attendants	4,801	3,412	71.0	278	1.7
397	6198	Occs. in Lab. & Other Elem. Wk-Serv.	4,693	3,496	74.4	271	50.8
398	6143	Barbers Hairdressers & Rel. Occs.	4,674	3,580	76.5	264	50.6
399	6135	Sleep-car & Baggage Porters & Bellmen	4,466	*	*	*	*
400	6125	Waiters Host. & Stew., Food & Beverages	4,431	2,997	67.6	284	70.5

APPENDIX A:  
 MEDIAN EARNINGS BY OCCUPATION AND SEX,  
 FULL-TIME, FULL-YEAR WORKERS, ONTARIO, 1971

RANK MEN	CODE	OCCUPATION	MEDIAN EARNINGS, MEN	MEDIAN EARNINGS, WOMEN	RATIO F/M EARNINGS	RANK WOMEN	% WOMEN IN OCCUPATION
401	7313	Fishermen: Net Trap & Line	4,261	*	*	*	*
402	4194	Hotel Clerks	3,976	3,659	92.0	254	40.6
403	7182	Farm Workers	3,462	3,076	88.8	283	20.6
404	5143	Newsboys	2,857	*	*	*	*

\* No women reported in this occupation.

\*\* Mean annual earnings figure used because median fell in open-ended category.

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<sup>1</sup> ILO Legi

<sup>2</sup> This de  
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## APPENDIX B: EQUAL PAY LEGISLATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES

## FRANCE

Although the French Constitutions of 1946 and 1958 guaranteed, in general terms, equal rights for men and women "in all spheres", specific legislation on equal pay was not enacted until the early 1970s. Previous legislation covering collective bargaining (dating from 1950), had required that before a collective agreement could be considered for "extension" to non-signatory parties by Ministerial Order, it must include clauses specifying how the principle of equal pay for equal work was to be applied. This legislation was strengthened in 1971 by the addition of a further requirement, namely, that such agreements should also provide for procedures to settle disputes arising out of application of the equal pay principle.

The Act of 22 December 1972<sup>1</sup> commences with the statement "Every employer is bound to ensure, in respect of the same work or work of equal value, equal remuneration for men and women". The term "remuneration" is defined quite broadly, to include not only the wage rate or basic salary but also "... all other benefits and wage supplements paid, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, by the employer to the employee on account of the latter's employment".<sup>2</sup> The Act also provides that the different wage components shall be established on the basis of identical standards for men and women, thus disallowing, for example, the maintenance of separate job classification or job evaluation schemes, for men and women. Where a collective agreement or contract of employment attempts to stipulate different wage rates based on sex for the same work or work of equal value, this provision will be automatically null and void, and those workers previously paid at the lower of the two rates will be entitled to receive the higher rate.

The Act charges the labour and manpower inspectorate with the responsibility for ensuring compliance with the equal pay provisions. All employers employing women are required to post a copy of the Act in the workplace. Penalties on employers for violation of the 1972 Act were specified in a subsequent law of March 27, 1973.

The 1972 Act is extremely brief, and leaves many important questions unanswered. For example, no guidance is given on the determination of what constitutes "equal value" work in situations where no work measurement or job evaluation scheme presently exists. It is, therefore, not clear from examination of the legislation itself how effective it is likely to be, in practice, in correcting existing discrepancies in pay between males and females performing different, but "equally valued" work, where job evaluation is not employed. Around the time

<sup>1</sup> ILO Legislative Series, 1972 - Fr. 3.

<sup>2</sup> This definition of "remuneration" follows closely the wording contained in Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community.

the Act was passed, one commentator noted that job evaluation, although used to a "substantial" extent in France, was nevertheless not so widespread as in the USA.<sup>3</sup>

No specific data by which to judge the effects of the 1972 Act on male/female wage differentials have been found. Information relating to a period prior to 1972 suggests that male/female earnings differences in France were already, at that time, narrower than in the other EEC countries.<sup>4</sup> However, it is not clear to what extent these differences in national male/female wage differentials are attributable to closer adherence to the "equal pay" principle, rather than to, say, differences between countries in the occupational employment distributions of males and females.

An attempt to compute male/female earnings differentials for separate broad skill categories in the manufacturing sector, rather than for all skills combined, has confirmed that sex differentials are generally narrower in France than in the remainder of the original EEC member countries, with one exception--for unskilled workers in Italy, where female earnings are 90.9 per cent of men's, compared with the corresponding figure of 84.4 per cent in France.<sup>5</sup> This same article suggests that if the earnings data were further adjusted for differences in age and seniority between the male and female workforces, the differentials diminish further in all countries studied.<sup>6</sup> Finally, one method of eliminating many of the "structural" factors which account for some of the difference in male/female earnings levels is to concentrate attention on specific occupations in specific industries. One such exercise<sup>7</sup> carried out for winders in the cotton-spinning industry reveals that female earnings for this occupation in France average 99.7 per cent of men's earnings for the same occupation.

Although legislative changes in France appear to have resulted in the establishment of job classification systems on a non-sex-discriminatory basis, in practice broad male/female earnings

<sup>3</sup> *Labour Relations and the Law in France and the United States* (Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson; Michigan International Labour Studies, Vol. V; University of Michigan, 1972).

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Chapter II of *Equality of Remuneration between Men and Women in Industrialized Countries* (Meeting of Experts on Equality of Remuneration, Working Paper No. 1, ILO, Geneva, May 1974).

<sup>5</sup> Evelyn Sullerot "Equality of Remuneration for Men and Women in the Member States of the EEC" (*International Labour Review*), Aug.-Sept. 1975) - see especially Table 1, page 95.

<sup>6</sup> Sullerot, op. cit., p. 96.

<sup>7</sup> Sullerot, op. cit., p. 96.

differences still remain, for a variety of reasons.<sup>8</sup> For example, it has been said that, in application, several job evaluation or classification schemes tend to attribute relatively greater importance to "male qualities" (such as strength, or physical effort) than to "female qualities" (such as speed, or dexterity); also, males tend to derive more benefit than females from such additional non-rate earnings elements as night shift premia, and seniority bonuses. Women are also under-represented in many of the higher-paying supervisory and skilled jobs.

In July 1974, France became the first country in Europe to establish a Ministry for Women's Affairs, with responsibility "to promote all measures aimed at improving women's conditions, to encourage access for women to different levels of responsibility in French society, and to eliminate discrimination to which they are subjected". It is reported that the Ministry is likely, in the near future, to press for a number of reforms including repeal of protective legislation (which, with few exceptions, bars women from night work); introduction of a program to encourage greater participation of women in training courses; and establishment of a special scheme to train women manual workers for higher skilled jobs.

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<sup>8</sup> "Equal Pay in France: A Progress Report" (*European Industrial Relations Review*, No. 20, August 1975).

## ETHERLANDS

Before discussing the recent Equal Pay Act in the Netherlands, it may be useful to briefly review Dutch experience with their national job-evaluation plan, which dates back to the late 1940s. The topic is of some interest in the context of "equal pay for work of equal value" because the scheme appears to represent the only attempt, outside of the Communist bloc, to devise and implement a uniform, comprehensive job evaluation plan on a national scale. Although it may be regarded as an extreme example, some of the problems which arose are amongst those requiring careful consideration when examining the feasibility of legislation based on the "equal value" principle. Moreover, despite the long-standing existence of the scheme, male/female wage differentials in the Netherlands appear to be wider than in most other West European industrial economies.

The genesis of the National Job Evaluation Plan lay in the circumstances surrounding the wage freeze introduced by the Dutch Government in October 1946. Wage increases were to be allowed in only two exceptional situations: (i) where the increases related to higher labour productivity, or (ii) where increases were needed in order to create a more equitable wage structure using job evaluation techniques. Perhaps not surprisingly, these regulations led quickly to the appearance of a multitude of different types of job evaluation schemes designed to justify wage increases. The wide variety of plans made comparisons of the results almost impossible, eventually inducing the trade unions to call for a single method of job evaluation to be devised. This was accomplished by forming a committee of job evaluation experts (drawn from management consultancy firms), who worked in co-operation with representative groups of employers and trade unions, to produce the so-called "normalized" method of job evaluation. One of the most difficult problems which arose was the question of translating the various existing methods into an equivalent value for the normalized method. However, "... variances obtained between different methods were much smaller than variances due to rating being done by different analysis".<sup>1</sup>

This National Job Evaluation Plan was integrated with a wages control policy which, in effect, provided a conversion chart for translation of job evaluated "point values" into a money wage rate, using a "straight line" conversion system. Thus, in theory, equally valued jobs would be accorded the same money wage rate irrespective of the establishment, company or industry in which the job was performed. Although no specific information has been found which would allow us to examine in detail the relationship between male/female wage differentials and operation of the job evaluation plan, it would seem that certain "exceptions" to the equal value principle were permitted e.g., "... government policy recognizes rural-urban cost-of-living differentials, *officially sanctioned sex differentials for identical work* and apprentices' rates".<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Martin P. Oettinger "Nation-Wide Job Evaluation in the Netherlands" (*Industrial Relations*, Vol. 4, no. 1, October 1964), footnote p. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Oettinger, op. cit., p. 49, (our italics).

<sup>3</sup> Oettinger

The new job evaluation plan met with considerable success in its early stages and proved extremely popular. The unions launched an ambitious educational program to familiarize their members with job evaluation, and were apparently so successful in stimulating enthusiasm for this approach that many members began to believe that job evaluation would always achieve higher wages. Following the initial period of euphoria, however, disillusionment gradually crept in as the national job evaluation plan, and associated control of wage differentials, was subjected to a number of stresses and strains of increasing intensity. In retrospect, government authorities were said to have been ".... overly impressed by the alleged 'scientific accuracy' of the normalized method .... The system was excessively rigid, particularly in regard to market forces".<sup>3</sup> More specific criticisms have included:

- a) The use of a "straight-line" wage gradient, which effectively precluded adaptation of the scheme to technological or structural economic changes;
- b) The use of a standard system of factor weights for all industries - the scheme seems to have been geared initially for use amongst production workers in the manufacturing sector, and the initial weights were based on labour market conditions at that time (1948);
- c) Notions of "social justice" or "equity" in some cases came into conflict with economic requirements--in effect, the role of changing wage differentials in the process of re-allocating labour was considerably diminished.

Eventually the rigidities implied by the initial constraints built into the program were loosened, and the "wage-points" relationship was abandoned completely. In the intervening period, however, illegal payments were made by employers in order to attract labour to scarcity occupations and a number of "experiments" were conducted with the aim of "stretching" job evaluation plans to justify wage levels required by market forces (e.g., in the construction trades).

It is difficult to judge to what extent the problems encountered derived solely from the association of the job evaluation plan with a policy of overall wage restraint, and from the close link between "value" and permitted money wage levels. Certainly these factors were of prime importance in explaining many of the difficulties experienced. However, it would seem that any attempt to base relative wages (even quite loosely) on the equal value principle is likely to run into a number of similar problems. The degree of flexibility required in the medium- to long-term in administering such a policy may inevitably give rise to a conflict between "equity" and economic realities (unless, of course, the government is prepared to "replace" the market by allocating labour resources more directly). In that

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<sup>3</sup> Oettinger, op. cit., p. 49.

case, the "euphoria-disillusionment" syndrome experienced in the Netherlands is likely to recur again, almost as a natural part of this process.

The results of nation-wide job evaluation give little encouragement to those who would advocate this approach to eliminate, or substantially reduce, sex-based wage differences. It should be reiterated, however, that the Netherlands scheme *appears* to have involved an element of formal sex discrimination as a matter of official policy. In 1969, women's average hourly earnings in Manufacturing (expressed as a proportion of the corresponding figure for men) were approximately 61 per cent in the Netherlands, compared with 77 per cent in France, 69 per cent in West Germany, 73 per cent in Italy and 68 per cent in Belgium.<sup>4</sup>

The 1975 Equal Pay Act in the Netherlands follows a concession made by the Dutch Government over the principle of legal enforceability of equal pay provisions. For some time, until recently, the Government had resisted pressures exerted by the European Commission to pass specific equal pay legislation, preferring instead to rely on the collective bargaining process to gradually reduce or eliminate sex-based wage differentials. Progress in this area was rather slow, however, although by mid-1971 male/female wage rate differentials had been removed from all industry-wide collective agreements, except those in textiles and pottery. During 1971, the Dutch Government finally ratified ILO Convention 100 (which calls upon members to "promote .... and ensure the application to all workers of the principle of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value"); in addition, the Government asked the Netherlands Economic and Social Council (a tripartite body comprising representatives of trade unions and employers, plus a group of "experts" nominated by the Government) to advise on the desirability of introducing legislation on equal pay. In the meantime, the Dutch Government had encountered strong pressures from the European Commission to enact equal pay legislation, culminating in a threat by the Commission to take the Dutch Government to the European Court if they refused to comply with this directive. In late 1973, the Economic and Social Council unanimously recommended that legislation be drafted to enforce the principle of equal pay. The Government's objections were dropped, and the April 1975 legislation was the result.

The main features of the legislation are as follows:<sup>5</sup>

- i) Both men and women are entitled to claim equal pay for work of equal value (in its original draft form, the Bill

<sup>4</sup> *Meeting of Experts on Equality of Remuneration* (Working Paper No. 1, ILO May 1974) Table 13, p. 27.

<sup>5</sup> A translation of the Act has not yet appeared in the ILO Legislative Series. Comments here are extracted from an article entitled "Equal Pay in The Netherlands", which appeared in *The European Industrial Relations Review* (No. 16, April 1975).

referred only to *women's* rights to equal pay--this was amended in passage through the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament so as to grant males, as well as females a legal entitlement to a wage "at least equal to that earned by their colleagues of the opposite sex" for work of equal value);

- ii) Work of equal value is defined as "work valued according to a reasonable system of job evaluation";
- iii) Comparison of wages, for purposes of the Act, is *not* limited to a particular enterprise, but may be made between different enterprises in the same branch of industry (a provision about which the employers' organizations are reported to be "unhappy");
- iv) The Act does not cover all aspects of remuneration (in particular, pensions are excluded);
- v) Workers can enforce equal pay rights under the Act by submitting a claim to a district court judge--however, this step must be preceded by a submission to a Committee on Equal Pay, which will provide advice and technical expertise on problems arising from the evaluation process (the Committee comprises two nominees from the trade unions and two from employer's organizations, chaired by a civil servant; all five members are appointed by the Minister of Social Affairs);

It has been suggested that the practical effects of the Act may not be very far-reaching. All industry-wide collective agreements will be required to eliminate discriminatory provisions regarding terms and conditions of employment; employees in these sectors may seek legal redress where their unions fail to press for implementation of the terms of the agreements. However, many women are employed in sectors not covered by collective agreements--in particular, almost half of the female workforce is in the retail trade, and many receive relatively low wages (e.g., certain part-time workers are not covered by minimum wage legislation, and the full minimum rate is not payable until age 23 years). The Act is not expected to have much impact on the wages of these groups. Moreover, it is anticipated that some companies may be able to avoid equal pay by creating special categories of "women's work" (several large companies have already done this). Even where job evaluation is already used, it seems that relative factor weightings are often such that many jobs which women primarily occupy tend to receive low "value" ratings. Similarly, payment of certain bonuses and premium payments may tend to discriminate against women. Resolution of this problem will depend, in part, on the ability of the Equal Pay Committee to develop effective methods of evaluating individual job performance.

NEW ZEALAND

The New Zealand Equal Pay Act was passed in 1972 and calls for full implementation by April 1977 (as amended). The Act provides for the "removal and prevention of discrimination, based on the sex of employees, in the rates of remuneration of males and females in paid employment". Under this piece of legislation, equal pay means "a rate of remuneration for work in which rate there is no element of differentiation between male employees and female employees based on the sex of the employees". (Equal Pay Act 1972, Sec. 2). Remuneration includes salary, time and piece wages, overtime and bonus and other special payments, allowances, fees, commission, and every other emolument.

The criteria for determining if an element of differentiation in rates of remuneration exists, based on the sex of the employees (for work not exclusively or predominantly performed by women) are the extent to which "the work calls for the same, or substantially similar, degrees of skill, effort, and responsibility", and the extent to which working conditions are the same or substantially similar. For work which is exclusively or predominantly performed by female employees, the rate of remuneration is to be that which "would be paid to male employees with the same, or substantially similar, skills, responsibility, and service performing the work under the same, or substantially similar, conditions and with the same, or substantially similar, degrees of effort" (The Equal Pay Act 1972, Sec. 3). The New Zealand Act differs considerably from the Ontario legislation by covering work performed exclusively by women.

Section 4 of The Equal Pay Act 1972 also provides that instruments<sup>1</sup> in force at the passage of the Act or in force before April 1, 1973 containing separate provisions for the remuneration of female employees, or making provision for female employees only, must determine (by a specified date) the classification of work performed by women in relation to that performed by men (using the criteria specified in Sec. 3), and the rates of remuneration representing equal pay for each classification.

The determinations of the work classifications are made by the parties indicated in the Act. For instance, in the case of an industrial agreement, the parties to that agreement or their representatives are to make the determination. If compliance is not attained, the determination shall be made by the Court of Arbitration. The Court has the power to state principles for the implementation of equal pay. The Court may also "determine the classification of any work, any rate of remuneration which would represent equal pay, the minimum percentage for the adjustment of any rate of remuneration of female employees, and any interim increase in remuneration required to be granted to implement equal pay, pursuant to section 4 or, as the case may be, section 5 of this Act".

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<sup>1</sup>"Instruments" include awards, industrial agreements, apprenticeship orders, agricultural workers orders, collective or ruling rates agreements, etc. as defined in The Equal Pay Act 1972, Sec. 2.

The criteria for determining equal pay apply to employees covered by individual instruments (see definition above) rather than employees in a given establishment, plant, etc. Since the Act is not fully in force until 1977, there are no reports of its effectiveness or its implications. The Act provides for implementation in five steps, the final step being April 1, 1977. These interim increases in remuneration towards the implementation of equal pay may be ordered by the Court in relation to any instrument (see definition above) which has not complied with Section 4 of the Act. Some sort of phasing-in or implementation period is a common provision in equal pay legislation.

## UNITED KINGDOM

The Equal Pay Act, passed in 1970 in Great Britain, came into effect in December 1975. This gave employees and employers a five-year period to make the necessary adjustments to comply with the Act. Some employers did this by a "phasing-in" process. Although the Act provided an option for an Order by the Secretary of State for partial implementation during the period December 31, 1973 to December 28, 1975, this course of action was not taken.

The Act is the first legislation in Britain in the equal pay area. The Act provides equal treatment for men and women with regard to terms and conditions of employment in an establishment<sup>1</sup> (a) for men and women employed on like work; and (b) for men and women employed on work rated as equivalent.

A woman is regarded as being employed on like work with men *only if* the work is of the same or a broadly similar nature, and if the differences between the two are "not of practical importance in relation to terms and conditions of employment". Account must also be taken of the frequency with which such differences occur as well as their extent and nature.

Work is rated as equivalent *only if* the job has been given equal value, in terms of various factors (skill, effort, etc.) taken into account by a job evaluation system which evaluates all jobs in a given undertaking. There is no obligation to establish a job evaluation scheme in the Act, nor does the Act provide assistance in establishing such systems.

Where a woman is employed in the same or broadly similar work as a man (Section 1 (a)), the British legislation brings that country's legislation into line with that now in effect in Ontario. Section 1 (b) which establishes equal pay for "work of equal value" goes beyond the present Ontario legislation in principle. Several exceptions to equal treatment of men and women are allowed by the Act:

- (a) Where there is a conflict with other legislation, such as protective laws affecting women's employment (weight lifting restrictions, limitations on working later hours, employment below ground, etc);
- (b) where special treatment is accorded women in maternity provisions;
- (c) in treatment regarding retirement age (Section 6) and pensions.

This differs from Ontario in that in this Province, protective legislation is being repealed or extended to cover men as well.

<sup>1</sup> In the same employment, that is employed by one employer or by any associated employer at the same establishment or at establishments in Great Britain which include that one and at which common terms and conditions of employment are observed either generally or for employees of the relevant classes.

Also, the Human Rights Code is being changed (clause (g), subsec. 1, Sec. 4) to eliminate differences in pensions and other fringe benefits for men and women in Ontario.

Under the Equal Pay Act, Sec. 3, collective agreements containing provisions for men only or for women only, may be referred (to the Industrial Court) for amendment to remove any discrimination between men and women. Amendments to collective agreements may (a) extend to both men and women any provision applying to men only or to women only; and (b) eliminate resulting duplication in the provisions to make them not less favourable than they would be without amendment.

The effect of this section may be illustrated with this example from notes pertaining to the Act.

If the skilled male rate in a collective agreement is 400s. a week and the skilled women's rate is 300s. for the same or similar work, the amendment will raise the women's rate to 400s. If the agreement lays down a weekly skilled male rate of 400s., a semi-skilled male rate of 350s., and unskilled male rate of 300s., and a women's rate for all classes of 240s. then the amendment will eradicate the women's rate of 240s. and assimilate the women's rates to those of the men. If, to take the previous example, there were no semi-skilled male rate of 350s., then skilled women would get 400s. and unskilled women 300s. Because there is no duplication regarding semi-skilled women, the last 12 lines of the subsection would have the effect of raising the rates of such women to 300s., i.e., they would get rates not lower than the lowest male rates.

Wages regulation orders containing unequal pay clauses are also to be amended (as above). "Wage regulation order" means an order made under Section II of the Wages Council Act 1959. At the time of the writing of the legislation, some wage orders were in effect which had set lower minimum wages for women than for men.

The question arises as to how meaningful the equalization of minimum rates in national agreements and in wage regulation orders for men and women will be, since relatively few workers of either sex are employed at those base rates. (Women are more likely to be employed at these minimum rates). Equal minimum rates for men and women are already provided in Ontario by the current equal pay legislation and by minimum wage laws.

The collective bargaining structure in Britain is perceived by several analysts to be a possible difficulty in implementing the equal value segment of the legislation. Britain has many national agreements covering crafts or industries. These are often supplemented by local negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Olive Robinson and John Wallace, "Prospects for Equal Pay in Britain : Retail Distribution and the Equal Pay Act 1970," *International Journal of Social Economics*, Vol. 1, no. 3, p. 252.

How job evaluation units fit in with the organization in different unions has determined the acceptability of job evaluation. The effect of such divisions "on equal pay implementation will now be an additional factor, and this could induce some<sup>3</sup> difficult and potentially bitter manoeuvring for position".

Job evaluation has not been used extensively on the industry level as a basis for implementing equal pay, and in the few cases where it has, "the exercise has often amounted to no more than a rough regrading without any detailed assessment of the relationship between particular jobs".<sup>4</sup> A Report of the National Board for Prices and Incomes found that about ten per cent of companies surveyed used job evaluation. In most cases, equal pay was *not* the reason for developing the job evaluation scheme and even under such schemes, it was usual for women to be paid less than men for work rated as equivalent.<sup>5</sup> Thus the effect of the equal value clause of the Act will depend upon the extent to which job evaluation systems are in place.

For the most part, the legislation merely brings Britain to the level we have already reached in Ontario. The equal value segments of the Act require equal pay for jobs rated as equivalent by formal job evaluation schemes where such systems already exist.

<sup>3</sup> G. J. Mepham, *Equal Opportunity and Equal Pay*, 1974, Institute of Personnel Management, London, p. 135.

<sup>4</sup> *Equal Pay: First Report by the Office of Manpower Economics*, 1972, Great Britain, Department of Employment and Productivity, p. 36.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

## UNITED STATES

Equal pay for women has had a long legislative history in the United States with the first state legislation being enacted in 1919. Proposals for Federal laws were first placed before Congress in 1945, however, Federal legislation did not come into being until the passage of the Equal Pay Act in 1963. The Act amends the Fair Labour Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 and places the coverage and enforcement of the equal pay principle under the FLSA.

The Equal Pay Act provides that no employer subject to the Act shall discriminate,

within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs, the performance of which require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.

Originally the Act covered an estimated 61 per cent of wage and salary earners in the United States.<sup>1</sup> Major exceptions, under the FLSA, were the following:

- (a) Executive, administrative and professional employees (including teachers) and outside salesmen;
- (b) Employees of a retail or service establishment which makes most of its sales in one state and with annual sales under \$250,000;
- (c) Farm workers on small farms;
- (d) Employees of certain seasonal amusement or recreational establishments;
- (e) Household employees.

Coverage of the Act was extended to executive, administrative and professional and outside sales employees by the Education amendments of 1972.

The United States Equal Pay Act took advantage of an inspection system already in place, as did the Ontario equal pay legislation. United States Wage and Hour Compliance Officers can make routine investigations, as do the Ontario Employment Standards Officers, as well as investigating specific complaints. Voluntary compliance with the Act is obtained in about 95 per cent of inves-

<sup>1</sup> Morag MacLeod Simchak, "Equal Pay in the United States" *International Labour Review*, Vol. 103, No. 6 June 1971 p. 551.

tigations in the United States. To 1971, about 200 court cases had been filed under the Equal Pay Act.<sup>2</sup>

In the U.S., jobs need not be identical, but only substantially equal in order to receive equal pay. A number of court decisions have been made as to what factors are taken into account when determining whether two jobs are substantially equal. In the case of the Wheaton Glass Company of New Jersey, the court found that jobs did not have to be identical in order for the incumbents to receive equal pay. In the Daisy Manufacturing Company case, the court ruled that both mental and physical exertion must be considered when measuring "effort". The Courts have also decided that occasional heavy lifting does not render jobs unequal which are otherwise equal. One court has also ruled that lower wages on the ground of alleged differences in group costs based on sex are illegal. The feeling of some equal pay proponents is that the use of the judicial system in the enforcement of equal pay legislation in the United States has expanded and can continue to expand the meaning of equal work and thus enlarge the scope of the legislation.<sup>3</sup>

Another analyst feels that by having interpretations of and rulings on various aspects of equal pay legislation carried out by many courts, the distinctions among criteria for equal pay are blurred. He also feels that the lack of a uniform interpretation of the legislation by the courts is a drawback and that the effectiveness of the equal pay principle is thereby lessened.<sup>4</sup>

The provisions of the Equal Pay Act in the United States pertain to wages including overtime and employer contributions for most kinds of fringe benefits.<sup>5</sup>

Overall, it seems that the United States Equal Pay Act of 1963 is similar in content, operation, and coverage (as amended) to the Ontario equal pay legislation. It seems to have the potential, however, because of the "skill, effort, and responsibility" clause to lean toward an "equal value" interpretation, depending upon future court decisions.

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<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., p.553

<sup>3</sup> John E. Burns and Catherine G. Burns, "An Analysis of the Equal Pay Act". *Labor Law Journal*, February 1973, pp. 97-98.

<sup>4</sup> Michael J. Klapper, "The Limitations of the Equal Pay Principle" *Industrial and Labor Forum*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1974, pp. 65-105.

<sup>5</sup> Simchak, op. cit., p. 551.











